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EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: DO THE EXCEPTIONS
OVERWHELM THE RULE? t
GARY E. MURG *
CLIFFORD SCHARMAN **
An employee's ability to retain his job traditionally has been subject to the
employment-at-will rule. Under this rule, an employer could discharge his
employee for no cause, good cause, or even bad cause.' This long-standing rule
was recognized uniformly throughout the nation, and until recently was ap-
plied without hesitation to give an employer the right to discharge an employee
for any reason. 2 During the past two decades, however, a surge of judicial in-
t Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School.
B.A., Wayne State University, 1967; J.D., Wayne State University, 1970; L.L.M.,
Labor Law, Wayne State University, 1974; currently adjunct professor at Georgetown Universi-
ty, Washington, D.C. and managing partner Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz (Detroit office).
** B.A., Cornell University School of Industrial Labor Relations, 1977; J.D., Universi-
ty of Michigan, 1980; currently associate, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz (Detroit office).
The case most frequently cited in support of this rule is Payne v. Western & Ad.
R.R. Co., 82 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn.
527, 514, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915):
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
dischatte or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for
bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which
an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause
or want of cause as the employer.
Id., 82 Tenn. at 518 - 19. See also Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158
Cal. 551, 554, 112 P. 886, 888 (1910); McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120, 125 (6th
Cir. 1959); Laiken v. American Bank & Trust Co., 34 A.D.2d 514, 308 N.Y.S. 111, 112 (1960).
2 See, e.g., Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1980); Miller
v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 225 Ark. 475, 481, 283 S.W.2d 158, 161 (1955); Union Labor
Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 555, 112 P. 886, 888 (1910); Lampe
v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513, 514 (1978); Somers v. Cooley
Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426, 428 (1959); Motion Picture Machine Projec-
tionists Protective Union, Local No. 473 v. Rialto Theatre Co., 25 Del. Ch. 347, 360, 17 A.2d
836, 840 (1941); Taylor v. Greenway Restaurant, Inc., 173 A.2d 211 (Mun. App. D.C. 1961);
Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So.2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1955); West v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
145 Ga. App. 808, 245 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1978); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho
333, 334, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (1979); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 III. App.2d 369, 371, 161
N.E.2d 355, 357 (1959); Davis v. Davis, 197 Ind. 386, 391, 151 N.E. 134, 135 (1926); Hanson
v. Central Show Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221, 1226, 130 N.W,2d 654, 657 (1964); Lorson v.
329
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tervention has threatened the continued legal validity of the employment-at-
will rule and the traditional relationship between an employer and an
employee. The central theme of this revolution in the employment relationship
is an emerging protection of the employee's job security.
Courts have begun to provide such protection by carving out exceptions to
the traditional rule in tort and contract law. To protect against discharges for
"bad cause," some courts have created a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule. These courts have recognized a tort of wrongful
discharge, under which employees can sue when their discharge violates public
policy. Other courts, under the rubric of contract law, have granted even
Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 679, 522 P.2d 449, 457 (1974); Gambrel v. United Mine
Workers of America, 249 S.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Ky. 1952); Pechon v. National Corp. Service,
Inc., 234 La. 397, 406, 100 So.2d 213, 216 (1958); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray,
198 Md. 526, 535-36,,84 A.2d 870, 874 (1951); Askinas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 330 Mass.
103, 106, 111 N.E.2d 740, 741 (1953); McClain v. Township of Royal Oak, 276 Mich. 185, 187,
267 N.W. 613 (1936); Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Mfg. Co., 288 Minn. 98, 100, 179 N.W.2d 73, 75
(1970); Carr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo. 1963); Jorgensen v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 25 N.J. 541, 554, 138 A.2d 24, 32 (1958); Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156,
159, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1959); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182
S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971); Wood v. Buchanan, 72 N.D. 216, 221, 5 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1942); Coey
v. Burwell Nurseries, 2 Ohio App.2d 102, 105, 206 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1965); Sooner Broad-
casting Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457, 461 (Okla. 1955); Densen v. Edmunds, 272 Or. 345, 349,
537 P.2d 77, 79 (1975); Fawcett v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 391 Pa. 134, 139, 137 A.2d 768, 771
(1958); School Comm. of Providence v. Board of Regents for Educ., 112 R.I. 288, 291, 308 A.2d
788, 790 (1973); Orsini v. Trojan Steel Co., 219 S.C. 272, 276, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951); Combs v.
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 166 Tenn. 88, 90, 59 S.W.2d 525, 526 (1933); NHA, Inc. v.
Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872
(Utah 1978); Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co., 209 Va. 460, 465, 164 S.E.2d 645, 649
(1968); Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wash. 2d 849, 852, 400 P.2d 292, 294 (1965); Wright v. Stand-
ard Ultramarine & Color Co,, 141 W. Va. 368, 381, 90 S.E.2d 459, 467 (1955); Kovachik v.
American Auto. Ass'n, 5 Wis. 2d 188, 190, 92 N.W.2d 254, 255 (1958); Lukens v. Goit, 430
P.2d 607, 611 (Wyo. 1967).
The employment-at-will rule also has been recognized in major treatises, see S.
WILLISTON, 9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1017 (3d ed. 1967); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS, 684 (1960 & Supp. 1971); RESTATEMENT QF CONTRACTS, 5 246 (1932), and has
been discussed and criticized frequently in law review commentary. See Madison, The Employee's
Emerging Right to Sue For Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6 EMP. REI.. L.J. 422 (1980); Note, Protecting
At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1816, 1818.19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, At Will Employees]; Note, Non-Statutory
Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will" Employment Relationship: A Possible Solu-
tion to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, ?4 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 743,
744-45 (1979); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 4-5 (1979); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle":
A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 WISC. L. REV. 777, 780-84 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Whistle Blowing]; Note, A Remedy for Malicious Discharge of the At-
Will Employee: Mange u. Beebe Rubber Co. , 7 CONN. L. REV. 758, 761 (1975); Note, A Common Law
Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HAST. L.J. 1435, 1438-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Abusive Discharge]; Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFF. L.
REV. 211, 212-16 (1973); Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis
- A Judge for Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970); Weyand, Present Status of In-
dividual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970); Blades,
Employment at Will v. Indibidual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Sercurity, 26 STAN. L. •REV. 335, 340-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract
Rights].
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greater job security to employees by moving in the direction of a "good cause"
requirement for employee discharges. These exceptions to the employment-at-
will rule may develop into a legal requirement that employers establish good
cause to effectuate the discharge of an employee. Such a requirement would
fundamentally alter the traditional employer-employee relationship, and
would impose enormous burdens on employers. Accordingly, it is submitted
that courts should proceed with caution when making inroads on this century-
old common law rule. 3 The harsh consequences which were the outgrowth of
bad faith employment practices should be remedied. Imposing on employers
the burden of justifying, in a court of law, each and every discharge of an
employee, however, may not be an appropriate solution. The good cause stand-
ard which may be implied into the employment contract, while providing job
security to the at-will employee, will result in great burdens upon an
employer's personnel practices. It may unduly restrict employers from exercis-
ing discretion in workforce selection. Communal judgment should not be per-
mitted to second-guess personnel decisions particularly among higher-level
confidential and mangerial employees. If an employer is required to justify
each employee termination the result will be costly inefficiencies and court
policing of employment practices. Employee expectations must not be defeated
but should be limited to express -promises, justifiable before an experienced
labor-relations neutra1. 4 Furthermore, the burden of proving that the employer
had a bad cause for discharge should remain upon the employee at all times.
Limitations to the emerging exceptions to the traditional rule may help to avoid
placing the employer in the inexorable dilemma of retaining employees or pay-
ing for the expensive defense of a necessary action.
In order to determine the appropriate contours of the employment-at-will
rule, this article will begin by tracing the origins and historical development of
the rule. It will then examine the job security accorded public sector employees
which may provide, by analogy, justifications and guidelines for court in-
tervention in the private sector employment relationship. It will discuss how an
at-will employee may sue in tort when a discharge violates public policy, and
It may be alternatively argued, however, that when the socio-economic conditions
that result in the development of the common law have radically changed, the rationale for the
rule no longer exists and the law is no longer in the best interests of society. Commenting on the
development of the common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., stated, "It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Lazy, 10 H ARV. L. REV.
457 (1897).
Complete judicial repudiation of a universally applied doctrine, however, may cause
great socio-economic disturbance unless it is adopted gradually. Expectations should not be
thwarted by complete repudiation of a doctrine upon which society relies. R. POUND, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 133-34 (rev. ed. 1954). "Efficient ordering of the
economy depends on planning by individuals or firms and such planning, it can be argued,
depends on predictability." J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 (1973). An
employer must not be burdened with a new doctrine without an opportunity to consider its conse-
quences when entering the employment relationship.
See text and notes at notes 271-312 infra.
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suggest appropriate limitations on this tort action. Several emerging contract
law exceptions to the rule will also be examined. These exceptions include
remedies predicated on detrimental reliance, implied promises of good faith
and fair dealing, and express promises of continued employment in the absence
of cause for discharge. The problems arising from jury determinations of what
constitutes good cause for discharge will be discussed. The article will conclude
with an examination of the interrelationship between tort and contract claims
and those brought under employment discrimination statutes.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERLYING POLICIES
OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE
A. Development of the Rule
The formulation of the employment-at-will rule crystallized in the late
nineteenth century. The American rule developed from the background of
English employment law, but deviated from it in significant respects. The rule
reflected the principles of contract law and the laissez-faire economics of the
late nineteenth century.
1. The English Law
The English courts determined that when an employment contract con-
tained a provision for an annual salary, the employer impliedly agreed to a
one-year term of employment. 5
 The courts imposed liability for breach of the
employment contract if the employee was discharged without good cause at any
time during the years The rationale for implying this one-year contract of
employment originally was to protect seasonal farm workers.' As the English
economy developed, the rule was extended to protect the new group of factory
employees.' Lack of work usually was not considered a good cause for
discharge. Consequently, it was difficult for an employer to effectuate a
discharge under the English rule without incurring liability for breach of con-
tract.' To defeat the presumption of a one-year contract of employment, a dif-
ferent intent would have to be clearly expressed on the face of the contract.'° A
contrary intent also could be established through a clearly defined custom of
the industry, which evidenced a shorter contract duration."
This presumption of a one-year contract of employment, implied from the
5 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 340. The presumption was carried
forth to the United States and was applied in all circumstances unless a contrary intent was
manifest in the agreement. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 125 (1969).
fi Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118,
119 - 20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Feinman].
' See id.
4 Id.
' Id. at 119.
10 Id. at 120.
" Id.
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term "annual," was inconsistent with an analogous rule in English landlord-
tenant law. Under English landlord-tenant law, the length of a periodic tenan-
cy was determined from the interval between rental payments.' 2 Where rent
was paid on a monthly basis, the rental contract was presumed to remain in
force and effect only for one month. Thus, a landlord could evict a tenant, for
any reason, by providing the tenant with one month's notice.' 3 The courts
would have been more consistent, therefore, if they had implied the employ-
ment contract term from the period of wage payments rather than from the
term "annual salary. "14 By analogy to the rule for periodic tenancies, an
employee who was paid every two weeks could have expected the contract to
remain in effect for two-week intervals. Consistency between the two bodies of
law would have required a two-week notice period to terminate the contract of
employment.
The English rule requiring an annual hiring period was subsequently
modified so that an employee could be discharged without good cause when
given a period of notice during which he would receive severance pay." The
length of the notice requirement varied among the industries from one to
twelve months." The notice requirement was predicated upon the custom of
an industry" or, more recently, upon statute." Thus, the parties to an employ-
ment contract began to rely upon certain fixed notice requirements which
became an implied term of the contract and which replaced the one-year term
of employment." The employer had to have a good cause when discharging an
employee to avoid payment of wages during the notice period. 24
2. Development of the American Rule
Although the development of the employment-at-will rule in this country
borrowed from English law principles governing the employment relationship,
i2 See Simmons v. Crossley, 2 K.S. 95 (Div'l Ct.).
19 Id .
For an in-depth discussion of this possible development in modern American
employment cases see Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 659 (1979). See also Singh v. City Serv. Oil Co., 554
P.2d 1367, 1369 (Okla. 1976).
" F. BATH, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 63-64 (5th ed. 1967).
16 See Feinman, supra note 6, at 121.
" Id.
'A Id.
" These periods vary from one to eight weeks. See 11 and 12 Eliz. II, c. 49. Redundan-
cy pay developed as an additional protection for employees who were discharged due to the
elimination of their position for economic reasons. See generally Industrial Relations Review and Report
No. 246 (April, 1981) and No. 250 (June, 1981). In recognition of the fluctuations of the business
cycle and the need for employers to reduce their work force when economic conditions war-
ranted, the notice provisions of the English law gradually were shortened and ultimately were
codified in the Contracts of Employment Act of 1963, 11 and 12 Eliz. II, c. 49.
'° In addition, England is one of 65 nations that impose a statutory requirement that
there should be a "valid reason for the job termination connected with the capacity or conduct of
the worker or based on the operational requirements of the employer." See Employer Discipline:
I. L. 0. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 446, 449 (1964); St. Antoine, Employee Terminations and the
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in its final formulation, the American rule deviated in significant respects from
its English precursor. In the early nineteenth century, some American jurisdic-
tions adopted the substance of the English rule by holding that the inclusion of
an annual salary provision in an employment contract raised a presumption
that the parties intended a one-year contract. 2 ' This rule reflected the tradi-
tional American notion that the master was responsible for the health and well-
being of his servants. 22
Changes in the law of contracts and in the economic realities of the nation,
however, led to the demise of the English rule in the United States. With the
industrialization of the nation in the late nineteenth century, the employment
relationship became more impersonal;" employers no longer assumed pater-
nalistic responsibilities for their employees' security. 24 In addition, under the
formalistic contract doctrines developed by the courts during this period,"
employers no longer incurred obligations merely from their status as
employers." Instead, employers became bound only on those promises which
they clearly obligated themselves to perform. 27
As a response to these developments in the nation's economy and in the
law of contracts, the courts adopted what came to be known as the
employment-at-will rule, sometimes referred to as the "Wood rule" for the
lawyer who first stated the principle. 25 Under this rule, the courts presumed
that all employment contracts could be terminated at will for any reason unless
Erosion of the At-Will Doctrine, DEVELOPING RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE WORKPLACE, 42
(1981) (Seminar, Chicago, Ill., December, 1981) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING RIGHTS]. See
also Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481,
485 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Summers], which compares the good cause discharge statutes of
France, Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden. See id. at 508-19.
21 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 340 & n.48; see also Feinman, supra
note 6, at 127-28.
22 The master-servant law of the United States was derived from the English common
law. See Feinman, supra note 6, at 118. The economic relationship of the early nineteenth century
was predominantly the single employee-employer relationship. See id. at 123. See also Note,
Abusive Discharge, supra note 2, at 1438-39. Journeymen frequently learned skills in the homes of
their master. See Feinman, supra note 6, at 123. From this close interpersonal relationship, the in-
dustrialization of the nineteenth century emerged, posing complex legal problems which were to
be answered by the courts. See id. See also Note, Abusive Discharge, supra note 2, at 1440-43. For an
in-depth study of the historical development of American industrialism, see N. WARE, THE
LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1895 (1929); N. WARE THE INDUSTRIAL
WORKER 1840 TO 1860 (1924); 21 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 258-66 (rev.
ed. 1896). See also Note, At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1824-25.
1'. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 325-26 (rev. ed. 1961),




25 See Note, At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1824-25. See also Feinman, supra note 6, at
124-25.
26 See Note, At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1824.
27 Id. at 1825-26.
26 The rule was named after its original proponent who wrote:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hir-
ing at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof.... [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is deter-
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the intent of the parties was clearly expressed to provide for a definite period of
employment. 29 The rule permitted the employer to discharge an employee for
good cause, for no cause or even for a bad cause unless the employer relin-
quished this right by an agreement providing for a definite period of employ-
ment. 3 °
The employment-at-will rule became institutionalized in the late nine-
teenth century in a series of New York cases. In the definitive case of Martin a.
New York Life Insurance Co. , 31 the court held that the annual salary term of an
employment contract did not automatically result in a presumption that the
contractual period of employment was for a full year."
As the rule became accepted throughout the nation, courts presumed that
the parties to employment contracts intended those contracts to be for no
definite duration." The courts refused to interfere with the nature of the
employment contract, thereby creating the presumption that an employee
could be discharged at any time. 34 Under the rule, the presumed contractual
intent of the parties differed from that which had existed under English com-
mon law. Under the American employment-at-will rule, the employer did not
bear the burden of proof to establish an intent that the contract was for less
than one year. This burden was placed upon the employee who was required to
establish that the parties intended to create an employment for a definite
period."
B. The Policies Behind the Rule
The adoption of the employment-at-will rule was prompted by the economic
realities of an industrializing society. It conformed to the principles of contract
law which existed during the period. The rule benefited employers because it
permitted their employment practices to respond to changes in the business cy-
cle." Had the English model been adopted, an employer would have been
liable to pay the remainder of an annual salary in every instance in which an
minable at the will of either party, and in this respect there is no distinction be-
tween domestic and other servants.
H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT $ 134 (1st ed. 1877). According to one commentator, there
was no adequate legal support for the rule of law thus stated. See Feinman, supra note 6, at 126.
Indeed, the cases cited by Wood to support the rule were distinguished in a recent decision of the
Michigan Supreme Court because they did not discuss what result would occur when an
employer expressly promised a good cause for discharge. See Toussaint v, Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 601-03, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886.87 (1980). Nevertheless, the rule was
adopted in numerous jurisdictions, see Feinman, supra note 6, at 126, and was hailed as the
universal rule by S. WILLISTON, 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 39 (rev. ed. 1938).
29 See Feinman, supra note 6, at 126.
30 Id.; Note, At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1825-26.
3 ' 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
32 Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417.
33 See Feinman, supra note 6, at 129.
34 See id.
35 See Note, Al Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1825.26.
36 See G. BLOOM & H, NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 227-316 (7th
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BLOOM & NORTHRUP].
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employee was discharged or placed on layoff. 37 Rather than being a variable
cost of production," labor would have become a fixed cost, impeding the free
transfer of capital and the growth of the economic system." Market forces
would not have reacted to establish true labor demand. 4° In contrast, under the
employment-at-will rule, an employer could alter the size of his workforce to
meet his changing production requirements without subjecting his decision to a
jury determination of whether cause existed for the decision. Although the rule
proved beneficial to the employer in a business-planning sense, it also resulted
in hardship for employees. The costs of the business cycle were imposed entire-
ly upon the employee. His attachment to his job was minimized with a result-
ant loss in control over his economic livelihood.'"
The contract principles of consideration, mutuality of obligation, and
mutuality of remedy also supported the development of the employment-at-will
rule. The principle of mutuality of obligation" required that both parties to a
contract be legally bound to perform their promises.'"
In an employment contract, however, the employee effectively was free to
quit his employment at a moment's notice." Although the employer could
always sue the employee for damages under a breach of contract theory, the
employer's recovery was limited to his actual losses.'" Unless the employee had
unique abilities, the recovery was worthless because the employer was bound
to employ a replacement. 46 In addition, the courts were not permitted to en-
force the contract specifically without violating the prohibition against involun-
tary servitude contained in the thirteenth amendment. 47 Therefore, the courts
" See text and notes at notes 5-11 supra.
38 See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 53-68 (2d ed. 1979). Rees
discusses the labor market and the interrelationship between wages, capital and the derived de-
mand for labor arising from the demand for the final product. Furthermore, the author discusses
the "marginal productivity theory of the demand for any factor of production." Id. at 54. Although
the employment-at-will rule is not discussed, it appears that impeding the employer's ability to
place employees on layoff would tend to make labor costs fixed over both the long run and short
run.
39 Id. at 53-68.
48 BLOOM & NORTHRUP, supra note 36, at 227-316.
▪ Blades, supra note 2, at 1405.
42 See A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 152 (1950 & Supp. 1971).
43 See id.
*4 See Blades, supra note 2, at 1419.
48
 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 367, comment c (1981). In
most circumstances, the employer's damages are limited to the costs of finding a replacement
employee. Pepe, Employer's Breach of Contract, Third-Party Interference and Post-Relationship Conduct,
DEVELOPING RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 59-61 [hereinafter cited as Pepe].
46
 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 367, comment a (1981),
which prohibits the issuance of an injunction in a personal service contract.
47
 H.W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 109 N.W. 483 (1906), where the court
stated: "When a court of equity intervenes to compel the employee to specifically perform a con-
tract for personal service, his service becomes involuntary, and his position becomes one of in-
voluntary servitude, a condition utterly incompatible with our institutions, and the fundamental
law of the land." Id. at 170, 109 N.W. at 488-89. See generally 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITIES JURIS-
PRUDENCE 5 1343 (5th ed. 1943); American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485
(1981).
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concluded that if the employee effectively was not obligated to continue to pro-
vide his services, the employer similarly should not be obligated to continue to
provide employment. As a result of the principles of mutuality of obligation
and mutuality of remedy, employment contracts for life were interpreted to be
in effect for an indefinite period and unenforceable."
The doctrine of consideration was an additional legal justification for the
employment-at-will rule." The principle of mutuality of consideration re-
quired that the parties to a contract give consideration for their respective prom-
ises. In an employment contract, the employee would provide his labor in con-
sideration for his pay. 5° Where the employee was no longer employed,
however, he would no longer give any consideration for his wages. Thus, to
have compelled an employer to pay wages for a definite period of time without
48 See generally A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 96 (1950 & Supp. 1971); J.
JACKSON, CONTRACT LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY 950 (1973). However, courts are permitted to
enjoin an employee from working for a competitor. See Pepe, supra note 20, at 58. This doctrine
has been utilized in rare circumstances when the employee has unique abilities, such as an artist
or sports celebrity.
4g The doctrines of consideration and mutuality of obligation are at the foundation of
the employment-at-will rule. Blades, supra note 2, at 1419; Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal.
App.3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1980). These doctrines have undergone major
modification over the past several decades- See generally A. CORBIN, I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 55
109-52 (1950 & Supp. 1971). Adequacy of consideration is not subject to judicial scrutiny except
where the bargain is unconscionable. See Dawson, Economic Duress — An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. REv, 253, 281-82 (1947); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAC'T'S 234,
comment c (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973): "Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself in-
validate a bargain, but gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a
determination that a contract is unconscionable ... ," id.; U.C.C. 5 2-302 (broad discretion in
court with respect to reforming unconscionable contracts).
Mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedy are no longer important principles of
contract law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 81 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973);
A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 5 152 (1950 & Supp. 1971). There are so many excep-
tions to the doctrines that they have been discredited. See J. JACKSON, CONTRACt' LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY 950 (1973); A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 5 152 (1950 & Supp.
1971). The modern analysis focuses upon the objective manifestations of the parties' intentions.
See Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L. J. 598, 599-602 (1969);
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 367 n.209. See also U.C.C. 2-309(3), which states:
"Termination of a contract by one party except on an agreed event requires that reasonable
notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is in-
valid if its operation would be unconscionable." Id.
Although Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is not applicable to the employ-
ment contract because its application, in general, is limited to the sale of goods, U.C.C. $ 2-102,
the justifications for its provisions may be viewed as equally if not more functionally appropriate
to the employment context.
Mutuality of remedy is similarly an outmoded doctrine of contract law. A. CORBIN, 1
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS $ 152 (1950 & Supp. 1971). Both employers and employees have a
damage remedy for breach of contract. Id. Although specific performance may not be used to
force an employee to work against his will because this would constitute involuntary servitude, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS 5 367, comment a (1981), where an employee has special
or unique abilities a damage action may be available to the employer for breach of contract. See
id., comment c.
50 See generally A. CORM, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 55 1181, 1184 (1951 & Supp.
1971).
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the concomitant receipt of services, would have violated the principle of
mutuality of consideration. In the absence of some special consideration flow-
ing from the employee, the courts found that the employee provided no con-
sideration for his employer's promise of future employment," and a court will
not enforce the promise under general principles of contract law . 52
C. Decline of the Policies Behind the Traditional Rule
Several factors have led to the decline of these traditional justifications for
the employment-at-will rule. One such factor is the growth of statutory regula-
tion of the employment relationship. This governmental regulation began in
the 1930's, with the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act" and has
proceeded with increasing force during the past two decades. 54 This retreat by
the legislature from ..laissez faire approach to employment practices has cur-
tailed much of the discretion which the traditional employment-at-will rule
conferred upon the employer. As a result of these developments, the free labor
market is no longer completely dependent upon competitive market forces."
In addition to the governmental regulation of the employment relation-
ship, an example of these governmental enactments was the adoption of
unemployment insurance statutes. These statutes place part of the economic
burden of the business cycle on the employer." Under these statutes, an
employee who is discharged or placed on layoff is guaranteed a percentage of
" Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 770, 259 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1979);
Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis.2d 388, 391, 153 S.W.2d 587, 589 (1967); Rasnick v.
W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 187 Ky. 523, 526, 219 S.W. 801, 804 (1920).
52 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 351-53.
53 29 U.S.C.	 151 et seq. (1976).
" Set, e.g., Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 5 152 (1976) (protects union activity); Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1674(a) (1976) (prohibits discharge of employees who
have wages garnished); Occupational Health and Safety Act; 29 U.S.C. 5 215(a)(3) (1976) (pro-
hibits discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the Act).
State statutes prohibit discharge for a variety of protected activity, including the rights
protected in the above statutes. See CAL. LAB. CODE 5 1102 (West 1971) (prohibits discharge for
exercising political rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 418.125 (1967) (prohibits discharge for filing
claim for workmen's compensation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 31-379 (West Supp. 1981) (pro-
hibits discharge for filing safety code claim); FLA. STAT. ANN. 448.03 (West 1981) (penal sanc-
tions for threatening employee with discharge for trading with particular firms). The above list is
only representative of state statutes which protect against discharge for engaging in activity pro-
tected by a statute.
" Compare Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), where the Court stated that:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its
essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions
upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right
of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, to
dispense with the services of such employee.
Id. at 174-75; with Coppage V. Kansas, 236 U.S, 1, 9-13 (1915) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
56 Although the level of benefits varies among the states the length of protection has
been extended by the federal government. See Federal-State Extended Unemployment Act of
1970, 26 U.S.C. 5 3304 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In certain circumstances the system will pro-
vide as much as 39 weeks of protection under the federal extended unemployment insurance pro-
gram. See id.
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his former wages or salary unless the employee's conduct prompted the
discharge." The business cycle and intermittent recessions are not considered
to be the type of good cause for a layoff which would defeat the employee's
right to collect unemployment insurance payments." Thus, the harsh results of
the employment-at-will rule are ameliorated partially in those circumstances
where there is no cause for a discharge or layoff. To the contrary, the economic
recessions inherent in the business cycle were the precise reason for enactment
of unemployment insurance statutes."
A different kind of governmental intervention in the employment relation-
ship is represented by state and federal statutes which prohibit the discharge of
an employee because of his status or because he has engaged in certain ac-
tivities. 60 These statutes express a legislative intent to provide special protec-
tion for certain groups of people and for certain activities. Discharging an
employee because of his status or because he has engaged in such specified ac-
tivities is deemed by the statute to be for a bad cause and is prohibited. 61
A number of additional factors have prompted a. change in the hands-off
approach to the employment relationship which has predominated in the
American courts. One factor is the changed nature of the requirement of con-
sideration in employment contracts. 62 The decline in the number of blue collar
jobs throughout society and a concomitant reduction in union membership as a
percentage of the work force, have resulted in a decreasing percentage of
employees protected by the grievance procedure that is incorporated in most
collective bargaining agreements." An analogous judicial trend protects the
job rights of public employees and may encourage similar protections for
private sector employees. 64
Some courts have perceived a need to enforce and effectuate a public
52 See, e.g., MICH. cow. LAws 5 421.29 (1967).
58 M.
" See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws 421.2 (1967), which states the rationale that prompt-
ed enactment of the statute in the following terms: "Economic insecurity due to unemployment
is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state." Id.
60 E.g. , Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 SS 703(a), 704(a), 42 U.S.C. S
2000c-2(a), 3(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. S 623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (Supp. III
1979); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, 5 U.S.C. S 7513(a) (Supp. III 1979).
61 See statutes cited at note 54 supra.
62 See note 49 supra.
" Union membership has declined from 35% to less than 25% of the workforce. See
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations at 72 (1973). This
statistic is more important because a significant number of union members are public employees
who already receive constitutional job protection. See section II infra. The decline in union
membership is significant to this discussion because most collective bargaining agreements re-
quire that an employee be discharged only for cause or good cause. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
40:1 (BNA). The grievance procedures which frequently culminate in arbitration provide an en-
forcement procedure for the good cause requirement. Id. at 5 51:1, 51:5. Thus, with the decline
in the number of employees protected by the grievance procedure there may be a perceived need
to protect employees through judicial cognizance of a cause of action for wrongful discharge. See
Blades, supra note 2, at 1410-11.
64 The Supreme Court has conferred a number of procedural guarantees on public
employees who are discharged. See section II infra.
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policy of the state through a tort cause of action for the discharged employee,
despite the difficulty courts have faced in defining the public policy they seek to
protect. 65
 Furthermore, there has been a growing judicial dissatisfaction with
the harsh consequences of the employment-at-will rule, particularly when an
employee relies upon an employer's promise of job security." The judicial in-
tervention may stem from a recognition of the importance of the job as an in-
tegral part of an individual's life in the modern industrial society.
Such governmental intervention in the employment relationship demon-
strates the erosion of the traditional laissez-faire policy behind the
employment-at-will rule. Employers no longer can reduce the size of their work
forces with impunity. In various enactments, both the state and federal
legislatures have determined that employers must share with their employees
the economic costs of fluctuations in the business cycle. Thus, one of the
policies behind the employment-at-will rule — to provide the employer with
the unfettered ability to determine the size and composition of his work force —
has been undercut.
The decline in the policies which supported the traditional rule has led
courts to create new exceptions to the application of the rule. The purpose of
these exceptions is to provide protection for employees who are discharged for
bad cause, or without good cause. Principles for protecting employees from
bad cause discharge were developed first in cases involving the discharge of
public sector employees. The exceptions developed in the public sector may
form an additional basis for protecting the private sector employee's expecta-
tions to a lifetime employment in the absence of cause for discharge. These
issues are addressed in the next section.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROPERTY RIGHT IN
EMPLOYMENT FOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
There have been several judicial exceptions to the employment-at-will
rule, including the added consideration doctrine and the contract of employ-
ment for a fixed duration. Before proceeding to discuss these judicial excep-
tions to the employment-at-will rule, however, it is necessary to review the
leading cases involving the discharge of public sector employees. It was these
cases that developed certain principles for protecting employees from a bad
cause discharge. Therefore, in addition to providing a historical perspective for
the more recent private sector cases, those decisions provide a theoretical
framework in which to determine the appropriate measure of job protection for
private sector employees.
During the past fifteen years the Supreme Court has decided several
cases67
 in favor of providing certain procedural safeguards of job security for
65 See section III infra.
66 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15 292
N.W.2d 880, 891-92 (1980).
67
 Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977);
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public sector employees. It is suggested that the development of these protec-
tions in the public sector may be the precursor to procedural protections for the
job rights of private sector employees at the expense of the traditional concept
of employment-at-will.
A measure of protection for the job security of public sector employees has
been provided by the establishment of procedural rights to a hearing prior to a
discharge. In Perry u. Sinderman, 68 the Supreme Court held that the summary
discharge of a college professor may have violated his due process rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 69 The Court ruled that due process
rights attach to prevent the discharge of a public employee, who has established
an identifiable property right in his continued employment or an infringement
upon the employee's liberty interest." The Court concluded that the professor
may have had such a property right in his teaching position, based upon a de
facto tenure system which existed at the university." According to the Court,
the university's faculty guide, which guaranteed continued employment for
faculty members as long as their services were satisfactory, may have given the
professor a legitimate expectancy that he would not be discharged without just
cause. 72 The Court held that if the professor could establish such an expectan-
cy, then he could not be discharged without a prior hearing to determine
whether just cause was present. 73
Thus, when a public employee can establish a property or liberty interest
in continued employment, the public employer cannot discharge the employee
for no cause or for bad cause and must explain the reasons for the action at a
hearing. 74 The crucial inquiry is whether the employee has a legitimate expec-
tancy to continued employment." This expectancy, which establishes the ex-
istence of a property right in employment, is determined by examining the
state law governing employment relations. 76 Where state law does not confer a
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
596-603 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1971) (per curiam); Pickering v.
Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 569-73 (1968); see also Slochower v. Board of Ed., 350 U.S. 551,
558-59 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-92 (1952).
54 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
fig Id. at 603.
70 Id. at 599.
" Id. at 600, 602.
77 Id. The faculty guide stated:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration
of the College wishes the faculty member to feel he has permanent tenure as long
as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative at-
titude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his
work.
Id. at 600.
" Id. at 603.
74 See id. at 602-03.
75 Funn v. Winston, 612 F.2d 880, 881 (4th Cir. 1980); Huntley v. Community School
Bd. of Brooklyn, 543 F.2d 979, 984 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1976).
" In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court stated:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather
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property right or would hold the expectancy unreasonable there cannot be a
protected property interest."
The Supreme Court has held that the expectancy in continued employ-
ment may be established from the conditions and circumstances surrounding
the employment relationship." In Perry, the Court found that an explicit con-
tractual provision protecting the employee's job was not necessary to establish
a property right." The employee could rely on statements contained in an
employment policy handbook or similar documents that promised continued
employment in the absence of cause for discharge, where the state law permits
the existence of a property interest based upon expectations created by such
documents or statements. 8 °
Private sector employees may receive similar promises of continued
employment in employment manuals or oral statements made by the
employer's representatives." Thus, cases such as Perry may form the basis for a
claim that private sector employees have legitimate expectancies to continued
employment which should also be recognized under contract law. Therefore,
further analysis of the public employee cases in various jurisdictions is
necessary to define the scope of protection these cases may give private sector
they are created and their dimensions arc defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.
408 U.S. at 577; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 n.8 (1976).
77 See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976). State law also is applied to deter-
mine the extent and formalities of the hearing which is required to comply with the employee's
due process rights. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
Due process requires that the employee be given an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 570
nn.7-8. It does not require that a full impartial or judicial hearing be accorded to all terminated
employees. See id. Furthermore, an employee may voluntarily waive his constitutional right to a
hearing. See Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 285-86, rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.
1977); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir. 1974); Hayes v. Cape
Henlopen School Dist., 341 F. Supp. 823, 834 (D. Del. 1972).
Due process rights also attach to identifiable liberty interests. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972). The liberty interest protects an employee's right to his good
name, reputation, and integrity from stigmatizing actions of the governmental employer. See id.
at 573. The purpose of the liberty interest hearing is to provide an employee the opportunity to
clear his reputation of the stigma of false accusations. Id. at 573 n.12; Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971).
78
 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593-602 (1972).
79 Id.
" Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976); Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 928
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1978); Thomas v. Ward, 529
F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1975). Bus see Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d
438, 448 (2d Cir. 1980).
The property right must be determined by reference to state law. However, heretofore
state law did not recognize the existence of a legitimate expectancy of continued employment.
Thus, there appears to be an internal inconsistency in the decisions interpreting the public sector
employee's rights.
81 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 597-99,
292 N.W.2d 880, 884-85 (1980).
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employees." In the absence of an express contractual promise or statutory
grant, it is suggested that the public employee in a jurisdiction adhering to the
at-will doctrine should have no greater protection of job security than the
private employee. Indeed, it has been held that a state's adherence to the tradi-
tional employment-at-will rule can deprive even public employees from assert-
ing a property right in their continued employment."
Because an expectancy to continued employment can be limited by state
law, there would seem to be no basis other than a specific statute or civil service
rule for finding a property right to continued employment in jurisdictions
adhering to the traditional rule. Therefore, in those states that adhere strictly to
the at-will employment doctrine, a policy handbook or oral promise of con-
tinued employment should be insufficient grounds for claiming a due process
property right to continued employment or a hearing. The right would not at-
tach because the relevant state law would negate any expectancy of such a prop-
erty right."
The above analysis has not been considered by the Supreme Court."
Thus, constitutional protection is granted to a public employee even though a
private sector employee would have no contractual right to a job under the
employment-at-will rule or other provisions of state law. Yet private sector
employees may have expectations of continued employment based upon
sources similar to those giving rise to property rights for public sector
employees. The principles contained in the public employee cases may form
the basis for recognizing the legitimacy of a private employee's expectations to
continued employment and for requiring an employer to explain the reasons
for a discharge in those jurisdictions which are inclined to recognize employee
expectancies that create a contract of employment." Courts willing to make in-
roads on the employment-at-will rule could draw on the principles of the public
employee cases in achieving that end.
III. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AS A LIMITATION
UPON THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE
Some courts have created an exception to the employment-at-will rule by
recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge. This tort provides a cause of
82 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 348-51.
83
	e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56, 60 (5th
Cir. 1979). In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court declined to find the existence of a
property interest where the employee was employed "at the will of the city." See id. at 345 n.8.
86
 See id.
85 See Burns v. Gulf Oil Corp., 619 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1078 (1981). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on a number of issues, one of which
was whether there is a substantive difference between a public and a private employer's discharge
of an at-will or non-tenured employee. Daily Labor Report A-13 (Jan. 12, 1981). In Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) the Court did not
consider this issue.
86 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 618 - 19,
292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980).
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action for employees who are discharged for engaging in certain activities
which are protected as a matter of public policy." The cause of action attempts
to eliminate the bad cause discharge or retaliatory discharge, when an
employee exercises a statutory right 88 or engages in "whistle-blowing" ac-
tivities which advance the recognized interests of society."
The cause of action was first recognized in the California case, Peterman v.
Teamsters Local 396. 90 In Peterman, an employee was discharged when he de-
clined to commit perjury during an investigation of illegal acts which were
alleged to have been engaged in by a union." The court found that the perjury
laws reflected an important public policy upon which the viability of the
" See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 184, 188-90, 344 P.2d
25, 27-28 (1959). See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172-75, 610 P.2d 1330,
1332-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. 8$39, 841-43 (1980). During the past two decades a growing number of
states have granted employees recovery under this cause of action. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 388.89 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74111. 2d
172, 181-86, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-59 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
252-53, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept of
Labor Services, No. 51,843 (Kan. App. 1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644,
646-49, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153-54 (1976); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 179-82,
413 A.2d 960, 968-69 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218-19, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1975);
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 612-13, 588 P.2d 1087, 1094-95 (1978); Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 32-33, 386 A.2d 119, 120-21 (1978); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
A number of state courts have implied the existence of a cause of action for wrongful
discharge but have refused to apply the theory to the case in question. See, e.g., Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. Ct. of App. 1981); Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa, 171, 177-79, 319 A.2d 174, 177 (1974); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290
N.W.2d 536, 537-38 (Wis. App. 1980). In addition, a number of federal courts have recognized
the existence of a cause of action for wrongful discharge when interpreting state law in diversity
suits. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New
York law); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Perks v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law).
But see Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Mississippi
law); Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying New
York law); Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512, 515-18 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (applying
Michigan law).
99 Recognizing this cause of action is analogous to recognizing an implied cause of ac-
tion under a statute. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 874A (Tentative Draft No. 23,
1977). For example, the filing of a worker's compensation claim is a right created by the
legislature, and is to be protected as a matter of public policy. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973). The statute, however, may not protect explicitly
against a retaliatory discharge. See Tamney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Ca1.3d 167, 177-78, 610
P.2d 1330, 1336; 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980). Nevertheless, courts have ruled that the
discharge, if allowed to stand, would violate the spirit if not the letter of the law and thus would
violate an expressed public policy. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844. To ad-
vance the interests protected by the statute, the courts have provided a tort action for wrongful
discharge and thereby have avoided the potential emasculation of the statutory safeguards. Id. at
173-77, 610 P.2d at 1333-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842-44.
09 "Whistle-blowing" is a term which refers to the actions of employees who report
criminal activity to the governmental authorities. See generally Comment, Whistle Blowing, supra
note 2, at 777 n.4.
9° 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
91 Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
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judicial process depended." Based on this finding, the court determined that
the employer's actions were tortious. The court reasoned that
[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to
public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge
any employee, whether the employment be for a designated or
unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined to
commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute. 93
Therefore, the court granted the employee a cause of action in tort to remedy
the unjust discharge."
Following the Peter man decision in 1959, several state courts have recog-
nized a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge." Even those deci-
sions adopting the tort, however, have been cautious in applying the theory
and have limited the circumstances in which it will be applied.
For example, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. , 96
 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an employee who claimed that his
discharge was wrongful after he had worked for over fourteen years. The court,
however, recognized the potential for a tort cause of action in such circum-
stances where a clear public policy was violated by the discharge." In Geary,
the employee was discharged after he had complained to his superiors that a
certain product had not been tested adequately and posed a health and safety
risk to the public." The employee argued that his conduct should have been
protected by a cause of action because his intentions were good and because he
acted in the best interests of society." The court refused to grant the employee
a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge. The court's refusal was
based in part on the employee's failure to use the procedural channels main-
tained by the employer which would have permitted the employee to complain
to his employer about the product.'°° The case left open the question of
whether a cause of action would have been recognized had the termination
resulted in a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.'°'
92 U. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
" Id. at 191, 344 P.2d at 28.
94 Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
9' See cases at note 87 supra.
96 456 Pa. 171, 319 A,2d 174 (1974).
" Id. at 173, 319 A.2d at 175.
98 Id. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175.
99 Id. at 181, 319 A.2d at 178-79.
'°° Id. at 181-83, 319 A.2d at 179-80.
L°' Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180. This statement has prompted the Pennsylvania Superior
Court to recognize a tart cause of action where an employee was discharged for activity protected
by statute. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 32, 386 A.2d 119, 120
(1978) (at-will employee fired for taking time off from work for jury duty). See also Perks v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1364 (3d Cir. 1979) (court applied Pennsylvania
law to permit a tort action by employee who was discharged for refusing to take a polygraph test
when the right to refuse to take the test was protected by state law).
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A recent decision by the Maryland court reflects an equally restrictive
view of the requirements of the tort action. In Adler v. American Standard Corp. ,102
the court recognized a cause of action to recover general, special and punitive
damages for abusive discharge but refused to grant the plaintiff in that case a
recovery.'" The plaintiff in Adler had been discharged after uncovering
numerous improper corporate activities, including payment of bribes, altera-
tion of sales and income information, attempts to treat capital expenditures as
expenses, and misuse of corporate funds.'" The plaintiff had reported his
discoveries to his superiors who refused to act upon his recommendations and
charges.'" After his supervisors requested that he resign, the employee was
terminated allegedly for unsatisfactory performance.'" In responding to the
plaintiff's claims, the court recognized the competing interests of the employee
and employer. The court asserted that an employee needs protection when a
discharge is caused:
not by genuine dissatisfaction witn job performance but because the
employee has refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to
perform a statutorily proscribed duty . Equally to be considered is
that the employer has an important interest in being able to
discharge an at-will employee whenever it would be beneficial to his
business. 107
The court held that the cause of action would be recognized only where the
discharge contravened some clear mandate of public policy.'" Under the facts
of the case, the court found that the plaintiff's claim failed to recite specifically
which statute had been offended in a manner which violated public policy. 109
In developing the tort action for wrongful discharge, courts have grappled
with the difficult task of determining which activities should be protected under
the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. Public policy is a
nebulous concept, having no clear and definite boundaries. "° The vagueness
of the concept has resulted in frequent litigation concerning which activities
should be protected by the tort action."' The courts have used three basic ap-
102 432 A.2d 464 (Md. App. 1981).
103 Id. at 472.
104 Id. at 466.
105 Id.
'° 6 Id.
'" Id. at 470.
1 ° 8 Id. at 473.
"g Id. at 472.
"° See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977). In Hinrichs, an
employee was discharged' because she refused to falsify medical records. Id. at 1131. The court
found the concept of public policy too vague a basis for the creation of a new tort and therefore
held that the issue was Lest left to the legislature. Id. See also Martin v. Tapley, 360 So.2d 708,
709 (Ala. 1978).
In Public policy has been loosely defined as the interests of society. See Petermann v.
Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 334 P.2d 25, 27 (1959). This definition is far too broad,
however, to provide meaningful parameters for the tort cause of action. In Nees v. Hocks, 272
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proaches to defining the term "public policy" and the activities protected
under that policy. In some jurisdictions, the courts have attempted to define
public policy on their own, without legislative guidance. These courts have
recognized the tort in instances of extreme violations of a clear and definite
public policy. For example, in Palmateer v. International Harvester, 12 the court
awarded damages for wrongful discharge to an employee who was discharged
in retaliation for his reporting to the police authorities that a co-employee was
engaging in criminal activities." 3 The court found that this discharge violated
an important public policy, and granted the requested relief. 14 Some judicial
definitions of public policy, such as that contained in Palmateer, provide
guidelines for drawing the outer limits of the tort action for wrongful discharge.
Thus, it is the rare circumstances involving important matters of well-defined
public policy, that will support a cause of action for wrongful discharge.['$
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), the court also offered a definition of the concept by asking, "are
there istances in which the employer's reason or motive for discharging harms ord a definition of
the concept by asking, "are there instances in which the employer's reason or motive for
discharging harms or interferes with an important interest of the community...." Id. at 216,
588 P.2d at 515.
In Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. App. 1981), the court
acknowledged the vague quality of the concept of public policy, and urged caution when using
the concept as a basis for judicial determination:
We have always been aware ... that recognition of an otherwise
undeclared public policy as a basis for a judicial decision involves the application
of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a given case, and that declaration of
public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch.
•
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague
and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from con-
stitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial
determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of one
generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another.
Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
Schroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977) is an example of the type of
issue which will be faced by courts when defining public policy. Therein, an employee sued for
wrongful discharge, alleging that he had been discharged because he was attending law school at
night. Id. at 812. He claimed that a discharge for that reason violated the public policy of the state
favoring education. Id. Although the court rejected the employee's claim, id., this case illustrates
the difficulty courts will face in defining what employee activities deserve protection as a matter
of public policy. The court stated that it would defer to the legislature to define the policies that
should be protected by the cause of action. Id.
" 2 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
13 Id. at 129-31, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80.
'" Id.
I " Id. See also Harless v. First Nat'l Bank In Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va.
1978) (Cause of action exists whenever an employee can show that the firing was motivated by an
intention to "contravenfel some substantial public policy principle."); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 219, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975) (serving on jury duty found to be of fundamental importance
to society). But see Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1980) (tradi-
tional employment-at-will rule reaffirmed when an employee was terminated allegedly for serv-
ing on a jury); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc. 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978) (court
refused to extend tort cause of action to discharge employee who had supported co-worker's claim
for unemployment benefits).
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An alternative approach to defining public policy is to require a legislative
definition of the protected employee activities prior to recognizing a cause of
action for wrongful discharge." 6 These courts presumably would refuse to per-
mit the tort action unless a public policy favoring an activity is discernible
within a statute that protects the activity. For example, in Martin v. Platt,t t' the
" 6 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
The public policy exception was applied to a professional employee who was demoted when she
refused to test a drug which was proscribed by FDA regulations. Id. at 62-64, 417 A.2d at 507.
The lower court had held:
[I]t cannot change the present rule which holds that just or good cause for the
discharge of an employee at will or the giving of reasons therefore are not required.
In addition, the exception must guard against a potential flood of unwarranted
disputes and litigation that might result from such a doctrine, based on vague no-
tions of public policy.... If there is to be such an exception to the employment-at-
will rule, it must be tightly circumscribed so as to apply only in cases involving tru-
ly significant matters of clear and well-defined public policy and substantial viola-
tions thereof. If it is to be established at all, its development must be on a case-to-
case basis.
166 N.J. Super. 335, 341.42, 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979).
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the public policy exception would not be ap-
plied in this case because the plaintiff failed to allege that the drug was harmful to the public but
merely that it was the subject of controversy. The court found this insufficient to state a cause of
action based on the public policy exception. 84 N.J. at 76, 417 A.2d at 514 (1980). The Court
looked to legislation, administrative rules, regulations, and decisions, and judicial decisions for
the sources of public policy. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
See also Sadovnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 824-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (protect-
ing integrity of pension plans is an important public policy); McNutty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 11 11, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (court did not dismiss employee's claims of wrongful discharge
when he was terminated for refusing to partake in an illegal pricing scheme); Trombetta v.
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 495-98, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388-90
(1978) (court granted cause of action but denied remedy for employee who refused to alter pollu-
tion controls in contravention of state criminal code); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255
Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 33, 386 A.2d 119, 121 (1978) (cause of action granted to employee who was
discharged after responding to jury service notice).
I" 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979). See also Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d
212, 214 (5th Cir. 1980); Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (E.D. Mo.
1975); aff'd, 539 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1976) (denying claims of employee who
filed legitimate complaints to the government about employer's deceptive trade practice and who
was discharged after he refused to give perjured testimony); Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582
S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Schroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Ky. App. 1977); Becket v. Welton Becket & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 821-22, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 534 (1974). Courts are more willing to create a cause of action where the legislature
has acted to protect a certain employee activity. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611
F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir. 1979) (cause of action granted employee who refused to take polygraph
test when the right to refuse the test was protected by statute); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App.
3d 69, 75-76, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404-05 (1970) (court recognized cause of action for asserting
eights under the minimum wage laws). But see Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App.
193, 194, 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1978) (no cause of action for employee who uncovered and reported
criminal activities committed by his supervisor).
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980), the court protected an employee who refused to engage in a price fixing scheme which
violated the criminal code. The court held that the wrongful discharge cause of action would be
applied wherever the employee was discharged for refusing to commit an act in violation of a
criminal code provision. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The court
analogized this rationale to the contract doctrine under which employment-at-will contracts are
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Indiana Court of Appeals found that an employee was discharged in retaliation
for reporting that his employer had received illegal kickbacks and granted a
cause of action because the employer activity violated a criminal statute." 8 The
Indiana court ruled that "the determin'ation of what constitutes public policy,
or which of competing public policies should be given precedence, is a function
of the legislature." 19 Similarly, in Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center,'" the
plaintiff claimed that her discharge for refusing to obey the instructions of her
superiors violated public policy."' The employer had discharged the plaintiff,
a supervising nurse, when she resisted instructions from higher management
because those orders conflicted with the plaintiff's ethical and professional
judgment. 122 The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the claim that this
discharge based upon a conflict in professional judgment would violate a public
policy because no statute protected the employee's right to assert her profes-
sional judgment.'" Under the rationale of these cases, a cause of action for
wrongful discharge will not be recognized unless and until the legislature has
modified the employment-at-will doctrine by enacting a statute protecting the
activity for which the employee was discharged.
The most frequent application of this statutorily-defined public policy ex-
ception occurs where employees are discharged in retaliation for filing a
worker's compensation claim.' 24 The courts' concern in these cases is that the
statute would not be enforced if employees feared the consequence of their fil-
ing a compensation claim would be discharge.' 25 The strength of the policy
recognized by the courts has prompted several legislatures to include non-
retaliation provisions in the workers' compensation statutes.' 26
The decision to defer to the legislature in defining the state's public policy
and the employee activities protected under that policy is consistent with the
view that an action in tort must be based upon the violation of a duty owed to
"' 386 N.E.2d at 1028 (Ind. App.). The whistle-blower protection accorded employees
in Martin is similar to the doctrine arising in landlord-tenant law prohibiting the retaliatory evic-
tion of a tenant who reports his landlord for a violation of the public health code. See Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969); Schweiger v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 517, 476 P.2d 97, 103, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1970).
"9 386 N.E.2d at 1028 (Ind. App.).
"° 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
121 Id. at 468, 590 P.2d at 515.
122 Id. at 467, 590 P.2d at 514.
In Id. at 469 7 72, 515-16. See also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,
71-72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
124 See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1979);
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 611-12, 588 P.2d 1087, 1094 (1978); Frampton v. Cen-
tral Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173
N.J. Super. 162, 179-82, 413 A.2d 960, 968-69 (1980); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 646-49, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976). But see Loucks v. Star City Glass Cu., 551 F.2d 745,
747 (7th Cir. 1977); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 770, 259 S.E.2d 812, 814
(1979); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 299-301, 244 S.E.2d 272, 276-77,
cerl. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
125 See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251-52, 297 N.E.2d 425,
427 (1973).
126 See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 8307c (West Supp. 1980).
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the plaintiff.'" In the absence of a statute protecting certain employee ac-
tivities, an employer owes no specific duties to its employees or to the public.'"
The enactment of such a statute, however, imposes specific duties upon
employers to respect the defined activities. That duty is violated when a
discharge would impede an employee from exercising lawful rights which are
protected by the statute.' 29
A statute recently enacted in Michigan may serve as an example for
creating a legislative definition of protected activity upon which an employee's
cause of action may be based. The statute protects an employee who engages in
whistle-blowing activity by prohibiting the discharge of or discrimination
against an employee who reports or contemplates reporting a possible violation
by his employer of federal or state laws or regulations.'" This method of
establishing the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule is
superior to the ad hocapproach currently used by most courts for protecting cer-
tain employee activities. The Michigan statute specifically delineates the
employer's potential liability,' 3 ' the burden of proof required to establish a
"7 See,' e.g., Tamney v, Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 172, 176, 610 P.2d
1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844.
An analogous doctrine in the tort law of personal injury holds that a defendant who
violates a statute is liable for negligence per se when: (1) the violation is causally connected to the
injury; (2) the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute; and (3) the harm
which resulted was the kind sought to be avoided by the statute. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS, 188-204 (4th ed. 1971).
Alternatively, a contract analysis may be applied once a statute has been enacted protect-
ing certain employee activity. A contract permitting discharge for engaging in the protected ac-
tivity might be deemed an illegal contract. A contract which is illegal is unenforceable. See general-
ly A. CORBIN, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 55 1373-1378 (1962). Therefore, the discharge provi-
sion of the employment-at-will contract cannot be enforced when the employer requires an
employee to engage in illegal activity.
1" See, e.g., Howard v. Door Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980),
where the court stated: We construe Monge to apply only to a situation where an employee is
discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that
which public policy would condemn." Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. See note 136 infra for the
holding in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
LID 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 469 became effective on April 1, 1981, and prohibits discrimi-
nation against employee whistle-blowers. The statute provides for specific remedies which may
be sought in a civil action brought under the statute. The civil claim must be filed within 90 days
of the alleged employer violation. MICH. COMP. LAWS S 15.363 (1970). An employer's potential
liability for a violation of this Act is substantial. Liability may include a reinstatement with back
pay and lost fringe benefits, actual damages, attorney's fees, other litigation costs, and assess-
ment of a $500 fine. Id. 5 15.365. Employees are protected when they report a violation or
suspected violation by their employer of federal or state laws and regulations. Id. 5 15.362. Fur-
thermore, an employee is protected when he is contemplating the filing of a report to an authori-
ty. Id. If contemplation is the basis of the lawSuit, the employee is required to establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he did contemplate reporting a violation. Id. 5 15.363. In addition,
discrimination is prohibited when an employee is requested by a public agency to participate in
an investigation, hearing, inquiry or trial. Id. 15.362. There is, however, no protection accord-
ed to an employee when the employee knows that his report is false. Id.
" I MICH. COMP. LAWS 55 15.364, 15.365 (1970).
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claim,' 32 and the specific instances in which a .public policy is deemed to have
been violated. 133
It is uncertain whether the courts will find that a legislative enactment pro-
tecting certain employee activities will, by negative implication, preclude a
cause of action for wrongful discharge arising from other employee activities.' 34
To avoid this uncertainty, the legislature should state explicitly in such statutes
whether the enumerated list of protected activities is intended to be exclusive.
In cases where the legislature has not stated its intent specifically, however,
there should be no presumption in favor of preemption. As a general matter, it
would seem reasonable to expect the legislature to incorporate all relevant
public policies into a single act. A doctrine of limited preemption could be
employed when the legislature acts in a specific area within the legislation. A
court could legitimately conclude that once the legislature has provided protec-
tion in a certain area, but has failed to protect against related or subsidiary
matters, by negative inference these matters do not give rise to a tort action in
that state. 135
The ad hoc protection provided by the public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule serves to shield certain employee activities from the
harshness of the rule. The case-by-case development of exceptions to the rule,
however, may result in substantial difficulties for employers in their personnel
decisions. 136
 Employers will be unable to determine, before the fact, whether
'32 Id.	 15.363.
133 MICH. COMP. LAWS gc 15.361 et seq. (1970).
' 34 See Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980), where the
court permitted a tort claim for wrongful discharge based upon the employee's filing of a
workmen's compensation claim despite the existence of a statute prohibiting such retaliatory
discharges. Id. at 179-80, 413 A.2d at 968-69. The court reasoned that the tort remedies may be
the most effective deterrent in those situations where the employee does not seek reinstatement
and therefore the statutory cause of action did not preclude a tort claim for wrongful discharge.
See id. at 181, 413 A.2d at 969.
'" It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy, a court must be chary of reading others into it. Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The ex-
press provision of specified powers may imply an intention to withhold those left unmentioned.
2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973).
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979), citing,
Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); TIME, Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959).
ii6 The competing policies embodied in the employment-at-will doctrine and the public
policy exception to this doctrine were best described by the court in Mange v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974):
In all employment contract, whether at will or for a definite term, the
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against
the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's in-
terest in maintaining a proper balance between the two. We hold that a termina-
tion by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad
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certain discharges are justifiable. Moreover, the potential liability of employers
for the tort of wrongful discharge is substantial.'"
Consequently, wrongful discharge claims will be filed by plaintiffs in the
hope that a court will recognize a new public policy. Spurious claims which
waste scarce judicial resources and which must be defended by an employer
might ensue during this period of judicial definition of the tort of wrongful
discharge. The resultant instability in the employment relationship would im-
pose substantial burdens on the employers who could never be sure whether
their personnel decisions were justifiable and not a violation of public policy.
As noted above, some courts have responded to this problem by refusing
to fashion an exception to the employment-at-will rule unless the legislature
has already acted to protect the particular employee activity. 138 An alternative
response would be to refuse to recognize a tort action for wrongful discharge
where the employee activity is protected by a different statute or remedy.
The court in Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. 139 followed this approach in
an action for wrongful discharge allegedly due to the employee's age and
sex.'" The court found that it was inappropriate to analyze the employee's
claim under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. The
court noted that the employee was not discharged "because of an affirmative
act on her part taken in an effort to claim a legal entitlement or for her refusal
to perform an act from which she would be protected by public poticy.,,141
Rather, the gravamen of her claim was that she had been discharged on the
basis of her age and/or sex.'" The court stated:
While it would be against public policy if either of these reasons were
the basis for her termination, statutory remedies have been provided
faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract.
(citation omitted)
Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
The balancing of interests is an important function of the court. Unfortunately,
however, it results in confusion for the parties, who may never be able to discern what is an im-
portant public policy before a personnel action is taken.
133 In suits for wrongful or abusive discharge, courts have awarded the traditional tort
remedies of compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages. Punitive damages may be
recovered where the employer knows that his activity would violate an employee's rights.
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 n.10, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.10, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 844 n.10 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 III. 2d 172, 186-87, 384 N.E.2d 353,
359 (1979) (based upon statutory remedies for retaliation for filing compensation claim); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 172 N.J. Super. 162, 181, 411A.2d 960, 969 (1980); Montalno v. Zamora, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 69, 77, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1970). See also Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass.
140, 145-46, 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976) (court recognized a claim of damages for emotional
distress).
'" See text and notes at notes 116-27 MOM.
139 448 F. Supp. 910.(E.D:•Mich. 1977), modified, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
448 F. Supp. at 912.
141 Id. at 917.
142 Id.
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to protect employees from discharge on the basis of sex or age, and it
is not necessary to expand the public policy exception to provide pro-
tection for employees for discharges based on status rather than
affirmative conduct.'"
Thus, where the activity or claimed status is provided independent protection
by statute, a court may decline to recognize a tort remedy under the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.
The court in Wehr v. Burroughs Corp. 144 discussed this limitation on the
public policy exception in the context of a breach of contract action.'" The
court reasoned that the public policy exception protects certain activities or
classes of employees because of certain strongly held policies of the
community. 146 When these activities or employees are protected by other
remedies, however, then the public policy is adequately served."' Based on
this reasoning, the court formulated a two-part test for applying the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule: "(1) ... the discharge [must]
violate some well-established public policy; and (2) . there must be no
remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society."'" Where
a statutory cause of action exists, it is submitted that there is no demand for a
judicially-created cause of action.
This limitation on the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule is consistent with certain decisions that addressed the issue of whether a
private cause of action shoUld be implied under a federal statute. Under these
decisions, one requirement for the implication of a private cause of action was
that the action be consistent with the underlying statutory policy.'" The im-
plication of a private cause of action is not consistent with the statutory policy
14 ' Id.
144 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1979).
'" 438 F. Supp. at 1053.
"6 Id. at 1055.
I" Id.
148 Id. Although the claim was for an alleged breach of contract, see id. at 1053, the ra-
tionale should be equally applicable to a tort claim. See Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448
F. Supp. 910, 917 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
149 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77, 78 (1975); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 688-709 (1979). In Cart v. Ash the Supreme Court recognized four factors relevant to the
determination of whether a federal statute should give rise to an implied cause of action: (1) is the
plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) is there any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one; (3) is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff; and (4) is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action. Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). More recently, the Supreme Court seems to have moved away from the
four-factor Cort v. Ash test to a test which focuses almost entirely on legislative intent. See, e.g.,
Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2622 (1981). In Sea
Clamrners the Court also indicated that where a statute includes an elaborate enforcement scheme,
a court should conclude that the remedies provided were intended to be exclusive "in the absence
of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent." Id. at 2623.
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when it would conflict with express statutory enforcement provisions. ' 5° These
decisions would support a contention that when the legislature specifically pro-
vides for a method of enforcement, the legislative policy would be cir-
cumvented if an individual was provided with an independent remedy and
thereby allowed to bypass the statutory and administrative procedure estab-
lished by the statute. Thus, litigants have been denied the alternative remedy
when the statutory enforcement scheme would be undermined by implying a
private action.'"
Similarly, a tort remedy for a discharged employee should not be permit-
ted where a specific statutory method has been provided for enforcing the right
infringed. The legislature frequently provides for administrative investigation
prior to litigation under a variety of statutes, most notably under statutes which
prohibit discrimination. To create a tort action would permit an employee to
bypass the administrative investigation and conciliation and undermine the
legislative policy supporting this stage of the proceeding. Furthermore, the
legislative policy of encouraging speedy resolution of disputes through the use
of a short statute of limitationsm would be emasculated by providing a tort
remedy under a two- or three-year statute of limitations.' 53
In addition to those situations in which a statute would provide a remedy
for the wrongful discharge, courts should dismiss tort actions alleging violation
of public policy when an employee has a full remedy under contract law. This
approach was followed-by the New York Supreme Court in Wegman v. Dairylea,
Inc. 154 In Wegman, the court dismissed a tort action brought by an employee
who had refused to participate in activities which would have been illegal under
a milk standardization statute.'" After examining the employee's employment
contract, the court found that the contract contained a just cause discharge pro-
vision. 156 Because the employee had a remedy under those contract provisions,
the court held that this limited remedy was more appropriate than a tort
remedy.'"
"D See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private
cause of action under §§ 503, 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq);
Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 1980) (court denied an individual a cause
of action for an employee whO claimed discrimination for self help in enforcing § 660(c) of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 el seq.).
"' See, e.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055-56 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
' 52 See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silvers, 447 U.S. 807 (1980), where the Court narrowly
construed the Title VII time limits found in 42 U.S.C. 5§ 2000e-5(c) and (e), to require a claim-
ant to file suit within 240 days of the alleged violation. Id. at 824-26.
1" See, e.g., the Michigan three-year statute of limitations for injuries to persons or prop-
erty, MICH. COMP. Lmvs.§ 600.5805(7) (1970).
154 50 A.D.2d 108, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1975).
' 55 Id. at 110, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
"6 Id. at 112, 376 NEY.S.2d at 734.
1$2 Id. One other issue that remains unresolved is the burden of proof which must be met
by a discharged employee in a tort action for wrongful discharge. The issue of whether a
discharge was in part motivated by the activity which involved a public policy or was instead
primarily motivated by a permissible reason for discharge has not been fully discussed by the
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The tort action for wrongful discharge attempts to protect certain
employee activities which are favored as a matter of public poicy. It thus is a
means for providing greater job security for private sector employees. The pro-
tection afforded by this tort action, however, is limited in several respects.
Courts may be unwilling to fashion exceptions to the traditional employment-
at-will rule unless the legislature has stated explicitly that the public policy
favors the particular employee activity. More fundamentally, this tort remedy
only protects against bad cause discharges. It stops short of providing that good
cause be shown in order to discharge private sector employees. Some courts,
however, have moved in the direction of such a good cause requirement under
a contract analysis that re-examines the nature of the employment relationship
and the employment-at-will contract.
IV. CHANGING CONTRACT LAW GOVERNING THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL CONTRACT
The recognition of a tort action for wrongful discharge represents a signifi-
cant departure from the traditional employment-at-will rule. The tort action
serves to protect employees from certain bad cause discharges where the
employee has engaged in activity which is protected as a matter of public
policy. Perhaps an even more significant departure from the traditional rule,
however, is the recent trend to find in the contract of employment an express or
implied condition that an employee can only be discharged in good faith or
with good cause. This trend may provide private sector, non-unionized
employees the same job protection achieved by union employees through
lengthy and often bitter strikes.'"
courts which have considered the tort of wrongful discharge. The cases do provide some guidance
on the issue, however. For example, in Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc.2d 1070, 410
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1978), the court held that in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
employee must file pleadings demonstrating that his employer's actions were based upon "an ex-
clusive malicious motivation for the acts of defendant." Id. at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739. In
Chin, the employer asserted reasons for discharging the plaintiff which the court found legitimate
and which therefore required the court to dismiss the claim. Id. at 1073-74, 410 N.Y.S.2d at
739-40. The court did not discuss what constituted a legitimate reason. The court in Perks v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law),
adopted a position favorable to employers when it stated "even when an important public policy
is involved, 'an employer may discharge an employee if he has a separate, plausible and
legitimate reason for doing so.' " Id. at 1366. See also Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270
N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978). In spite of this statement by the Third Circuit, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has held that where the facts permit an inference that the true reason for the
discharge implicated the public policy, the jury's determination that the plaintiff's discharge was
based on an improper motive will not be disturbed. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255
Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 34-35, 386 A.2d 119, 122 (1978). The mixed motive discharge has troubled
courts under labor legislation at the federal level. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150,
105 L.R.R.M. 1169, 1170-71 (1980), aff'd, NLRB v, Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc.,
662 F.2d 899, 108 L. R.R. M. 2513 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp.,
598 F.2d 666, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1979); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 1067, 1073
(1st Cir. 1979).
158 See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 342-60
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The employment-at-will rule has traditionally been an implied term of
most employment contracts. 159 Under this rule the contract could be ter-
minated by either party at any time and for any reason."° This general rule
governed all employment contracts in the absence of three limited exceptions.
First, the rule would not apply where the employer explicitly contracted to
employ the employee for a definite duration.' 61 In these circumstances, the
employee could be discharged only for cause during the specified term.' 62 Sec-
ond, courts on occasion refused to apply the rule where the discharge violated
public policy."' A final exception to the employment-at-will rule was recog-
nized in those circumstances where the employee had provided consideration
in addition to the normal incidents of accepting employment.'" Such con-
sideration might include the relinquishment of a tort claim against the
employer, the gift of an invention to the employer, a substantial move by the
employee, or the foregoing of a vested pension or union security to accept the
new employment.' 65 Thus, the courts deviated from the implied employment-
at-will provision of employment contracts in only a limited number of cir-
cumstances.
These exceptions in contract law to the application of the employment-at-
will rule have been expanded in recent years. This development has moved the
law of contracts governing the employment relationship in the direction of re-
quiring the employer to demonstrate good cause for the discharge of an
employee. The traditional exception to the at-will rule of employment
predicated upon additional consideration has gained new vitality. ' 66 In addi-
tion, courts have begun to include an implied provision of good faith and fair
dealing into employment contracts. 1°7 These two developments, together with
(1970); T. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE ch. XV (2d ed. 1971) (discussing the strike as a process
to achieve union goals). Ninety percent of a sample of collective bargaining agreements require
that a discharge be for cause or just cause. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACTS 5 40:1 (BNA).
159 See cases cited at note 2 supra.
160 See text and notes at notes 28-34 supra.
161
 Henkel v. Educational Research Council of America, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 344
N.E.2d 118, 119 (1976). See generally A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 96 (1950 & Supp.
1971).
162 Cloverleaf Farms, Inc. v. Surratt, 169 Ind. App. 554, 349 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. App.
1976).
' 63 See text and notes at notes 87-89 supra. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the court analyzed the claim that a discharge violated public policy in
terms of contract law rather than tort law. Id. at 132-33, 316 A.2d at 551. A similar analysis was
used in O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978). The court declined to
dismiss a breach of contract action where the employee was discharged for refusing to take illegal
action as directed by his supervisor. Id. at 417-18, 390 A.2d at 150. The court held: "an
employment-at-will [contract] may not be terminated by an employer in retaliation for an
employee's refusal to perforrii an illegal act." Id. at 418, 390 A.2d at 150.
64 See text and notes at notes 172-94 infra.
' 65 Id.
166 Id.
167 See section IV.B. infra.
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the emerging doctrines of reliance and estoppel, have led courts to conclude
that the parties to an employment contract do not necessarily intend to include
an at-will discharge provision in their contract.'" Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, courts have begun to construe certain promises of continued
employment, which previously had been viewed as having no binding effect, as
giving rise to a contractual provision requiring good cause for the discharge of
an employee. 169 In recognizing these implied provisions to employment con-
tracts and express promises of job security, courts have relied less on traditional
contract concepts,'" which previously had been used to defeat the claims of
employees, and more on emerging doctrines of reliance, estoppel and addi-
tional consideration in an effort to determine the true intent of the parties. 17 '
"8 See text and notes at notes 172-269 infra.
"9 See text and notes at notes 236-70 supra.
' 7° Courts have relied on a variety of theories to defeat breach of contract claims by
employees even where employers expressly promised continued employment. See, e.g. , Lynas v.
Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687-89, 273 N.W. 315, 316-17 (1937). In Seco Chemicals, Inc_
v. Stewart, 169 Ind. App. 624, 628-34, 349 N.E.2d 733, 736-39 (1976), the court rejected several
attacks on the enforceability of a contract promising continued employment. Citing A. CORBIN,
1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 31 (1963), the court first held that the contracts, although not signed
by the employer, would be valid if the parties had intended that the agreement be enforceable
without signatures. 169 Ind. App. at 628-29, 349 N. E.2d at 736. The court next rejected the
employer's argument that the agreement was unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation
because the employee could quit at any time. Id. at 630-32, 349 N.E.2d at 737-38. The court con-
cluded that "where one party to an agreement acts upon the promises of theother party and per-
fo2d at 737-38. The court concluded that "where one party to an agreement acts upon the pro-
mises of the other party and performs his part of the agreement," mutuality will exist because the
other party becomes bound by performance. Id. at 632, 349 N.E.2d at 738. The Seco decision is
distinguishable from the indefinite employment contract situation because the court ruled that
there was an ascertainable expiration date. Id. The case is revealing, however, in its treatment of
traditional defenses asserted to defeat an oral contract of employment for a period in excess of one
year. See also Vassallo v. Texaco, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 642, 643, 422 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1979).
1 " This doctrine of examining the true intent of the parties has been applied in several
cases arising in California. The California Supreme Court has stated:
It is fundamental that when construing contracts involving substantial
employment rights, courts should avoid mechanical and arbitrary tests if at all
possible; employment contracts, like other agreements, should be construed to
give effect to the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the language used, the purpose to be
accomplished and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.
*
We embrace the prevailing viewpoint that the general rule requiring independ-
ent consideration is a rule of construction, not of substance, and that a contract for
permanent employment, whether or not it is based upon some consideration other
than the employee's services, cannot be terminated at the will of the employer if it
contains an express or implied condition to the contrary.
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972)
(emphasis added). In Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App, 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1976), the plaintiff, employed by a former employer for 16 years, agreed to accept new
employment pursuant to an oral understanding that her new employment would be permanent if
her performance was satisfactory. Id. at 94-95, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24. The plaintiff was
discharged, however, allegedly without good cause. Id. at 95, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 224. The court
upheld an award of damages to the plaintiff, explaining:
It is settled that contracts of employment in California are terminable only for
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A. Additional Consideration and Estoppel Theories
Separate or additional consideration traditionally has been one exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine. 12 Additional consideration has been held
sufficient to make a contract for continued employment binding upon both par-
ties because theoretically it establishes the intent of the parties that the
employee is not to be discharged without good cause.'" Under this theory, the
contract for permanent employment becomes enforceable through the
employee's sacrifice of a tangible or intangible right in consideration for the
employer's promise of continued employment.' 74 Examples of such additional
consideration are the employee's surrender of a tort claim against the
employer,'" or the employee's contribution of capital to the employer's
business enterprise.' 76
The traditional formulation of this exception to the employment-at-will
rule recognized only a limited number of employee activities which could pro-
vide the requisite additional consideration. For example, an employee did not
provide additional consideration by moving short distances to accept new
employment. Under the recognized analysis, an employee was expected to
move to his employer's location and, by accepting the job, an employee
good cause if either of two conditions exist: (1) the contract was supported by con-
sideration independent of the services to be performed by the employee for his pro-
spective employer; or (2) the parties agreed, expressly or impliedly, that the employee could
be terminated only for good cause.
Id. at 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (emphasis added). See also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86
Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411 (1978).
In Pugh v. Sec's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), the
court held that the duration of employment, commendations made by the employer and promo-
tions received by the employee, lack of criticism, and oral promises of continued employment
resulted in an implied promise of cause for discharge. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 351-55.
172	 If an executed consideration is given by the promisee, a promise of
employment on stated terms is not rendered unenforceable by the fact
that the employment is to continue permanently, or for an indefinite
period or as long as the employee wishes to stay. The employee is not
bound; but the employer is bound. There is no mutuality of obligation;
but there was other sufficient consideration.
A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 14 n,11.15 (1963). See Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart
Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225 (1976).
'" See Piechowski v. Matarese, 54 N.J. Super. 333, 148 A.2d 872 (1959); Roxana
Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 P. 502 (1924).
14 The classic example of the "additional consideration exception" is an employee's
surrender of a tort claim against his employer. Courts determined that the surrender of a tort
claim was sufficient for enforcement of the employer's promise for continued employment
because it avoided highly, inequitable results and established the employer's sincerity when it
made the promise. See Pierce v. Tennessee Coke, Iron & R.R. Co., 173 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1899); East
Line & Red River R.R. Co. y. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75-78, 10 S.W. 99, 102-04 (1888).
1 " 72 Tex. at 77, 10 S.W. at 103.
"6 Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971).
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necessarily gave up alternative job opportunities.' 77 Therefore, such actions
did not result in an enforceable good cause for discharge provision in an
employment contract.
Recently, however, some courts have attempted to broaden the definition
of additional consideration. Now, for example, an employee who foregoes
lucrative employment opportunities may supply sufficient additional con-
sideration to bind his employer to a promise of continued employment. For ex-
ample, in Hackett v. Foodmaker, Inc., 178 the employee moved his family from
California to Michigan in reliance upon the employer's promise that he would
be made the manager of a retail food outlet. 19 Plaintiff was denied the position
because he filed an anti-trust action against the employer.'" The court ruled
that the promise was enforceable because of the employee's reliance upon it. 1 e'
This reliance was established by objective evidence consisting of the long move
which had been undertaken and the fact that plaintiff had begun to perform
other services for the employer. 182 The court held that the employer's total
repudiation of the employment contract would not be tolerated after the
employee's substantial detrimental reliance.'"
Thus, by broadening the concept of additional consideration, courts have
enforced with greater regularity promises by employers of continued employ-
ment. An alternative means of enforcing such promises is found in the contract
theories of reliance or promissory estoppel. Indeed, in some cases, it is difficult
to determine which of the two theories courts have used to support a claim for
breach of contract. Promissory estoppel protects the promisee where there are
no mutual promises made which would give rise to contractual obligations but
one party relies upon the singular promise of the other party.'" In essence, it
serves as a substitute for consideration.'" To enforce a contract on grounds of
promissory estoppel the court must find the existence of four factors: (1) a clear
and definite promise by the employer; (2) which the employer should
reasonably expect to induce reliance by the employee; (3) which induces an act
'" As the court stated in Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 183, 274
N.W.2d 10, 12 (1978), "Passing up other employment opportunities was merely preparatory to
commencement of plaintiff's new position with defendant." See also McLaughlin v. Ford Motor
Co., 269 F.2d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1959); Rowe v. Noren Pattern and Foundry, 91 Mich. App.
254, 258, 283 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1979). IN see Rabago- Alvarcz v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 91, 95, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222, 224 (1976).
178 69 Mich. App. 591, 245 N.W.2d 140 (1976).
'" hi. at 593, 245 N.W.2d at 141.
180
181 hi., 245 N.W.2d at 141-42.
'" M. at 593-94, 245 N.W.2d at 141.
"3 M. at 595, 245 N .W.2d at 141-42. See also Grouse v. GrUlip Health Plan,	 306
N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981), where the court granted the employee a remedy after the employer
revoked a job offer relied upon by the employee who quit his former job and based upon this
reliance he refused to accept an alternative job opportunity.
'" Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 133, 257 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1977).
185 See id
360	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:329
which is prejudicial to the employee's interests; (4) which action is based in
reliance upon the aforementioned promise. 186 Under this theory, the employee
would possess a right to enforce the promise because of his detrimental
reliance. Thus, the offer of employment may be enforced where it is revoked
after the employee resigns his former position. Whether the employer should
be prohibited from discharging the employee unless he has cause is a different
question which has not been addressed.
In addition to promissory estoppel, some courts have recognized the
employee's arguments of equitable estoppel where additional consideration
was found to be present. 187 Under this approach, the court finds that where an
oral promise of continued employment has been made, traditional contract
defenses, such as the statute of frauds or the lack of mutuality of obligation, are
no longer available to the employer. The employer is equitably estopped from
asserting his defenses because of the oral assurances of continued
employment188
 that induced the employee to accept the position.
It should be noted that oral promises of continued employment are not
always sufficient to establish a claim based upon estoppel. In McMath v. Ford
Motor Co. , 189 for example, the court found that such promises were too in-
definite and unclear to support a claim under either promissory or equitable
estoppel principles. ' 9° The oral promise of continued employment was found to
be unenforceable.' 9 ' Hence, the employer was not equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of frauds defense to defeat the oral promise.'"
188
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 90 (1981), defines promissory estoppel
in the following manner:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise.
187
 See, e.g., Pursell v. Wolverine Pentronix, Inc., 91 Mich. App. 700, 702-04, 283
N.W.2d 833, 834-35 (1979).
188 See American Electrical Steel Co. v. Scarpace, 399 Mich. 306, 249 N.W.2d 70
(1976). The court held in a non-employment case that the acts of plaintiff which resulted in a
possible loss of a right were based upon the defendant's assertion of the existence of a certain state
of facts. Id. at 308-09, 249 N.W.2d at 71. The court stated:
Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying the truth of a fact
which has in contemplation of law become settled by the act of the party himself,
expressed or implied. If one's conduct induces another to believe in the existence
of certain facts, and the other acts thereon to his prejudice, the former is estopped
to deny that the state of facts does in truth exist.
Id. at 308, 249 N.W.2d at 71 (citing Detroit Say. Bank v. Loveland, 168 Mich. 163, 172, 130
N.W. 678, 682 (1911)). Under this reasoning, when an employer asserts that his employee has a
lifetime job, and the employee relies on this presumed state of facts to his detriment, then the
employer may be estopped from denying the truth of his statements. But see Crownover v. Sears,
Roebuck Sr Co., 594 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1979), where the court rejected claims of reliance
because of an employee's unreasonable interpretation of the profit sharing plan.
189 77 Mich. App. 721, 259 N.W.2d 140 (1977).
190
 Id. at 725-27, 259 N.W.2d at 142-43.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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When estoppel theories are applied, it is a question of fact whether the
employee's acts of detrimental reliance were reasonable and were induced by a
clear and definite promise by the employer.' 93 Where the plaintiff employee
desires a jury trial, however, the extent of the detriment suffered would seem to
override the other elements required to be proved in a promissory estoppel ac-
tion. The greater the detriment suffered by the employee, the greater the
likelihood that the employer's promise will give rise to a breach of contract ac-
tion because the evidence is more persuasive that the parties intended that the
promise would be enforced.'" Use of estoppel theories to broaden the addi-
tional consideration exception to the employment-at-will rule, however, may
upset an employer's customary mariner of managing his workforce. A jury
may defeat the expectations of an employer regarding his labor-management
affairs by concluding that customary practices of the employer induced acts of
employee reliance which it believes are sufficient for the application of an
estoppel theory. Thus, there are risks inherent in applying these theories.
In summary, the emerging trend toward expanding the additional con-
sideration doctrine may lead to increased judicial enforcement of oral promises
of continued employment. The presence of some element of additional con-
sideration flowing from the employee to the employer may give rise to
equitable estoppel preventing the employer from asserting traditional contract
defenses. Thus, the detrimental reliance of the employee, if reasonable, will
render enforceable the employer's express promise of continued employment
in the absence of good cause for discharge.
B. An Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in Employment Contracts
Another recent development in contract law governing the employment
relationship is the implication of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into
the employment contract. A small number of courts have found that, as a mat-
ter of law, there exists a right to fair dealing which is implied into all contracts
including those for employment.' 95
'" See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111  Cal. App. 3d 443, 454-55, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980); Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix Co., 91 Mich. App. 700, 710, 283 N.W.2d 833,
838-39 (1979).
194 The theory of intent, however, is only valid if the employer is aware of the detriment
suffered by the employee. If the employee can assert his detriment in all contracts of employ-
ment, regardless of the employer's knowledge of the burdens suffered by the employee, the con-
tract would be predicated upon the unilateral intent of the employee rather than the mutual in-
tent of the parties. The elements of a promissory estoppel action require that the employer
reasonably expect his promises to be relied upon by his employee to his detriment. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 90 (1981).
' 95 Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548, 551-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 932 (1964); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., II 1 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1980); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1255-56 (1977). See also de Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th
Cir. 1971).
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The implication of a condition of good faith and fair dealing into the
employment contract has its origins in traditional contract law which protected
employees who had earned certain benefits in the course of their employent.
Contract law recognized a distinction between such employees who had earned
or almost earned a benefit through their past service and employees who were
paid for their current services. 196
 To protect the vested or almost vested prop-
erty right of employees who have prior earned benefits, the courts implied into
their employment contracts something similar to an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Coleman v. Graybar Electric Co."' is representative of the
protection accorded such employees. - in Coleman, the court recognized an
employer's obligation not to deprive an at-will employee of his previously
earned benefits by discharging the employee without good cause. The plaintiff
in Coleman was a salesman whose compensation was determined in part by
commissions which were to be paid annually and which were based upon the
previous year's sales record. 198
 The express purpose of the compensation plan
was to provide "an incentive to continuous service with the company.' " 99
 The
plaintiff was discharged forty-four days before his annual commissions were to
become payable."° The employer asserted that the employee's incompetence
was sufficient cause for discharge and relied, in the alternative, upon the
employment-at-will doctrine."' The court refused to permit the employer to
exercise unilateral control over the payment of the promised higher wage scale
based upon the previously earned commission. The court implied a good cause
requirement into the discharge provision of the employment contract, thereby
enforcing what it construed to be the intent of the parties."'
The rationale of these decisions protecting earned employee benefits is
analogous to that underlying the equitable theory of quantum meruit. 203 Under
96 Coleman v. Graybar Elec. Co., 195 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1952) (applying Texas
law).
1 " Id.
198 Id. at 376 n.l.
199 Id.
2°° Id. at 375.
20 ' Id. at 375-76.
2° 2 See id. at 378. The court reasoned:
[A] construction of the language ... which would permit the employer to ter-
minate the continuity of service without any cause and as a matter of arbitrary
choice, or because of a desire to evade the payment of additional compensation
would be entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the plan and, in the absence of
clear and compelling language, should not be adopted ....We do not think that
the language of the employment application which granted the employer the right
to terminate the employment in its discretion at any time can be so imported into
the language of the compensation plan as to authorize a construction of its provi-
ions to mean also that a discharge, even if otherwise authorized without cause,
would bring such a cessation of employment within the terms of the forfeiture pro-
vision.
Id. at 377.
2° 3 D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 237-38 (1973); A. CORBIN, 5 CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1109 (1963).
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this common law theory a master may not deprive his servant of pay which has
been earned for past services by merely rescinding the contract. 204 A discharge
immediately prior to the scheduled payment of a past earned benefit will create
a jury question on the issue of whether the employee was discharged in bad
faith to avoid payment of the vested benefit. 205 Alternatively, the court may
construe the benefit as one which has already vested but is subject to
defeasance only upon a showing of good casue. 2°6
The Coleman court appeared to distinguish betwen a contract for compen-
sation and a contract of employment."' Although this is a subtle difference, the
distinction between the two contracts is important. A contract for compensa-
tion defines the conditions and circumstances under which an employee will be
paid, whereas the contract of employment establishes the terms and conditions
governing the employment relationship. Under the Coleman court's approach,
the traditional employment-at-will rule would remain applicable to all employ-
ment situations where compensation has not previously been earned by an
employee, while a good cause requirement would be applied to prevent an
employer's revocation of a previously earned commission. 2"
The recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in For-
tune v. National Cash Register Co. 209 also implied a duty of good faith and fair
dealing into an employment contract. Because the facts of the case involved an
attempt to deprive an employee of a vested benefit, the court's holding falls in
the mainstream of such cases. The court's reasoning, however, may provide a
basis for implying a covenant of good faith into all employment contracts. In
201 Id.
205 See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1257 (1977).
205 See Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (8th
Cir. 1980); Atkinson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 519 F.2d 1112 (5th
Cir. 1975).
207 See Coleman v. Graybar Elec. Co., 195 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1952), where the
court held: "[W]e conclude that in this case the contract did not authorize a forfeiture of addi-
tional compensation provided in the plan of compensation if the services of the employee were
terminated arbitrarily and without just cause."
206 See Gaines v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 78 N.J. Super. 168, 188 A.2d 179
(1963), where the court clearly distinguished a contract of employment from a contract for a
benefit. Under the terms of an oral contract of employment, the employee was to be the
beneficiary of a stock option agreement. Id. at 174, 188 A.2d at 182. The option was subject to
defeasance if within five years the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily separated from his
employment. Id. at 176, 188 A.2d at 183-84. The employee was discharged without a stated
cause close to the end of the five year period. Id. at 176-77, 188 A.2d at 184. The court permitted
the employee to maintain an action to recover the stock option, id. at 179, 188 A.2d at 185, but
rejected the employee's claim for lost salary. Id. at 181, 188 A.2d at 186-87. The court stated:
"Mhe word 'involuntary' was not meant to, and therefore does not, include a discharge without
cause, especially one made in bad faith for the purpose of destroying plaintiff's option." Id. at
179, 188 A.2d at 185. In refusing to construe the plan as conferring a contract right to continued
employment, however, the court stated: "[E]ven if 'involuntarily' is construed as excluding
discharge not for cause, and the option is preserved, it still does not give the plaintiff the right to
employment or salary for the balance of the five years." Id. at 181, 188 A.2d at 186-87.
204 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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Fortune it was alleged that the employer's purpose in discharging the employee
was to avoid the payment of a commission bonus. 210 The plaintiff was a
salesman who brought suit after his discharge for the recovery of commissions
to which he was entitled under an express employment contract. 2 " The con-
tract provided for the payment of a cash bonus for all deliveries on a sale. 212 In
this case, certain deliveries were made over an extended period of time on a
contract that had been formed as a result of plaintiff's efforts. 213 However, the
plaintiff was paid a commission only on those deliveries which were accepted
during the previous month. 214 His discharge was alleged to have deprived him
of commissions on future deliveries for a sale that had been previously credited
to his account. 215 The employee was discharged after he refused to retire upon
the employer's request. 216
 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of his discharge,
he had been denied a bonus to which he was entitled under the express employ-
ment contract. 217 The court stated that it was for the jury to determine the
employer's real motive in terminating the employment relationship."' The
court instructed the jury that if it found that the reason for the discharge had
been to avoid the payment of a bonus, the express contract would have been
breached and the termination would have been made in bad faith. 219 The court
held that the written contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith would constitute a
breach of that contract. 220 The court stated that it merely was recognizing the
implied condition of good faith and fair dealing that generally is present in all
commercial contracts. 2 "
210 Id. at 97-99, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54.








216 Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
2 " See id.
218 Id. at 103, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
219 Id. at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1258. See also RLM Associates v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 356
Mass. 718, 248 N.E.2d 646 (1969), where the court held that it was for the jury to determine
whether the employer discharged a salesman to avoid paying a commission.
22° 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
221 Id. at 103-04, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The court cited MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106,
1-203 (U.C.C.); The Motor Vehicle Franchise Termination Statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 93B,
.5 4(3)(c); Kerrigan v. Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 33, 278 N.E.2d 387 (1972) (collective bargaining
agreements); Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 187, 158 N.E.2d
338 (1959) (insurance contracts); Chandler, Gardner & Williams, Inc. v. Reynolds, 145 N.E.2d
476 (1924) (contracts to beperformed to the satisfaction of one party). 373 Mass. at 102-03, 364
N.E.2d.at 1256. The Fortune court granted the remedy under an implied covenant which was
deemed to have been contained in the express contract. See id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
The decision contains language which limits its holding to the facts of the case. See id. The court
refused to extend the implied. covenant to all employment contracts but stated that where an
agent is on the brink of completing a successful sale, and his principal seeks to deprive the agent
of his compensation for that sale by terminating the relationship, the termination is in bad faith.
See id. The court cited numerous cases which prevent an employer from eliminating an employee
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Although the court in Fortune purported to limit its holding to the facts of
the case, the decision nevertheless may lay the foundation for implying a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing into all employment contracts."' Before us-
ing the rationale of Fortune, however, courts should recognize the difference
between a contract of employment under which wages are to be determined on
a commission basis and one in which wages are to be paid on a continual and
periodic basis because the discharged employee has a significant interest in his
vested or previously earned compensation. 2"
Courts will not permit a bad faith discharge to defeat an earned benefit.'"
benefit which is almost earned by the rendering of substantial service. See id. Thus, the decision
relied upon principles embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 454 (1958):
An agent to whom the principal has made a revocable offer of compensation if he
accomplishes a specified result is entitled to the promised amount if the principal,
in order to avoid payment of it, revokes the offer and thereafter the result is accom-
plished as the result of the agent's prior efforts.
Id. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass, at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:
The typical situation for the application of the rule is that in which a broker or
other intermediary has so nearly succeeded in procuring a customer or completing
a transaction that the principal believes that he can perform the rest of the transac-
tion without further assistance or expense. If, in this cHse, the principal ter-
minates the agency, either to save for himself the broker's commission or to let the
buense. If, in this case, the principal terminates the agency, either to save for
himself the broker's commission or to let the buyer or another agent have it, the
broker is entitled to the agreed compensation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 454, comment b (1958). The traditional employment
contract is based on the principle that wages constitute the consideration for the work which is ac-
tually performed. See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 352. Thus, by terminating an
employee there is no lost consideration due to an employee for work which has not yet been per-
formed and for which the employer receives no other additional consideration. Id.
222 See McKirney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980), where
the court ruled that a discharge based upon a violation of the ban against age discrimination
violated public policy and therefore clearly breached a covenant of good faith which was implied
into the at-will employment contract. See id. at 1118, 1121. See also Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc.,
488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 348 F. Supp.
590 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979). In Moore,
the court held that although all employment contracts contain an implied obligation of good faith,
under Arizona law an employer need not show good cause for discharge and no liability was in-
curred where the employer discharged a long-term employee seven and a half months prior to the
vesting of his pension. Id. at 1074-75.
22' Bul see Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 728 (1980). In Cleary, the court held that the duty to act in good faith and fair dealing applies
to all contracts. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28. The court stated:
The duty which arises from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is un-
conditional and independent in nature; it is not controlled by events in the same man-
ner as conditions precedent or subsequent ....It is equally well settled that the
employer must act in good faith; and where there is evidence tending to show that
the discharge was due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services the
question is one for the jury.
Id. at 543, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
"4 See, e.g., Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250, 1257 (6th Cir. 1971)
(court protects a stock option plan); Lemmon v. Cedar Point, Inc,, 406 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1969)
(court protects a stock option plan); Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875, 887-88
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It is not completely appropriate to move from that principle, however, to the
proposition that all employment contracts contain an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. This would deny the employer control and discretion in
determining his work force composition which has become expected under the
employment-at-will rule. This development may also result in a tort cause of
action with tort recoveries for a claim that appears to be a breach of the
employment contract. Recently, however, some courts have made this
analytical inference by implying a good faith requirement in cases that do not
involve attempts to deprive an employee of a vested benefit.
In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. , 225 for example, the California Supreme
Court refused to recognize the distinction between bad faith discharges to
defeat an earned benefit and other kinds of employee discharges. The court
stated, in dicta, that a duty of good faith and fair dealing was to be implied in
all employment contracts. 226 According to the court, a breach of this duty
might lead to liability for breach of an at-will employment contract. 227 In
Cleary, the plaintiff employee alleged that he was discharged for his union ac-
tivities. 228
 Although the jurisdiction had a statute preventing discrimination for
engaging in union activity, the employee elected to sue under tort and contract
theories. 229 The court recognized a cause of action in favor of the employee,
based upon a combination of legal theories, including the tort of wrongful
discharge. 230
Similarly, in Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc. , 231 a federal district court inter-
preting New York law, granted a remedy for the tort of abusive discharge
based upon the existence of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court enforces separation pay provision); Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co„
346 Mich. 568, 579-80, 78 N.W.2d 296, 301-02 (1956) (court protects termination pay benefit);
Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 670, 211 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1973) (court pro-
tects separation pay). See also Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Cp., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh, 2287, 2300,
429 N.E.2d 21, 29 (court protects future compensation clearly related to past service of at-will
employee who was discharged without good cause).
No separate contractual rights originate from a pension benefit because the benefit is
calculated from actuarial formulae which take account of the risk of an eleventh hour discharge.
Schneider v. McKesson Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1958); Hardy v. H.K. Porter
Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175, 11.82 (E.D. Pa. 1976). An employee recognizes the contingency risk in-
volved in an unvested pension. The unilateral contract for a pension benefit is not accepted until
all requirements have been fulfilled. See generally Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 684-85 (5th
Cir. 1975); Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 532-33 (3d Cir. 1970); Schneider
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1958).
223
 111  Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
2" Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
222
 Id.
228 Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
223 See id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
230
 These theories included: the tort of wrongful discharge, and estoppel theory
predicated upon the eighteen years of service provided by the employee, an oral contract
guaranteeing continued employment, and the employer's duty to act in good faith. Id. at 456,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
231 488 F: Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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in the contract of employment. 232 The court found that the unexplained
discharge of a thirteen-year employee within two years of the vesting of his pen-
sion benefit may have violated this covenant.'" The court permitted the
employee to pursue a remedy in tort, reasoning that the integrity of a pension
plan was a strong public policy. 234 In refusing to dismiss the claim, the court
also relied on the good faith obligation of the employer. 2"
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. and Savodnik v, Korvettes, Inc. may have set
the stage for the demise of the employment-at-will doctrine. The logical exten-
sion of the holding in those cases would protect many salaried at-will employees
because they have some form of deferred compensation such as a pension plan.
To imply a just cause provision in the contracts of such employees, thereby
prohibiting their discharge in the absence of cause rather than protecting their
earned benefit, would abolish the employment-at-will doctrine. Such an ap-
proach would fail to recognize the significant distinction between enforcing the
employee's right to an earned or almost vested benefit by implying a good
cause for discharge requirement to defeat the benefit, and enforcing the
developing right of job security through implication of the good cause term in
the contract of employment. This distinction should not be ignored by courts.
C. A Contract of Continued Employment
Perhaps the most significant recent development in the law governing the
employment relationship involves the enforcing of certain explicit promises of
continued employment made by an employer which traditionally were regard-
ed as having no legal effect. Recent decisions have provided a cause of action
for breach of contract in what had previously been construed as at-will-
employment relationships. 236
 The implications of these decisions are extensive
and may radically alter the traditional employer-employee relationship.
Examples of documents which, under these recent decisions, may create
enforceable contract rights include employee manuals, personnel policy hand-
books, and employee brochures which explain certain employee benefits, such
as pension plans. These documents often contain representations about the
conditions of employment and may be construed as a promise that the
employee will remain with the employer in the absence of good cause for
discharge. 237
 Such representations of continued employment also may be made





	 id. at 825-27. Thus, the court permitted the plaintiff to sue under a tort theory,
with the full panoply of tort remedies, but determined that the tort duty stems from a contractual
obligation which was implied into the contract of employment.
tab
	 v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927
(1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 614-15, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980).
2" See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 357.
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to employees through oral promises at an employment interview or during the
course of an employee's tenure.
Courts traditionally have enforced a variety of the promises contained in
such personnel policy manuals. Courts have held that employers must abide by
promises to provide certain benefits such as pensions, 238 severance pay, 239 com-
pensation bonuses, 24° and seniority systems for layoffs and promotions. 24 ' The
promise of continued employment, however, traditionally had been held unen-
forceable. Some courts now have determined that these statements and prom-
ises are inducements for acceptance of employment and therefore should be en-
forced. 242
A recent Michigan decision finding a good cause requirement for
discharge arising from employer representations of continued employment is
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan. 243 In Toussaint, the court
recognized a cause of action for the employee based upon an alleged breach of
the employer's oral promises and written statements contained in an employee
policy handbook which guaranteed continued employment in the absence of
just cause for discharge. 244 The employee stated that at his initial employment
interview, he was told that he would remain with the company as long as [he]
did [his] job." 245 In addition to this oral promise, the company's personnel
policy manual represented that it was the employer's policy, applicable to all
non-probationary employees, to require good cause for discharge. 246
 The court
held that oral or written statements, such as those in the instant case, or the
employee's legitimate expectations founded upon those statements could give
rise to an enforceable contractual provision requiring good cause for
discharge."' According to the court, refusing to enforce such express promises
zss Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250, 1253 (6th Cir. 1971); Bird v.
Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 463, 133 A.2d 894, 897 (1957); Schofield v. Zion's Co-
op. Mercantile Inst., 85 Utah 281, 293, 39 P.2d 342, 347 (1934).
2" Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875, 887-88 (SA/N.Y. 1975); Cain v. Allen
Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 579-80, 78 N.W.2d 296, 301-02 (1956); Clarke v. Brunswick
Corp., 48 Mich. 667, 670, 211 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1973); Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189
Va. 531, 542-43, 53 S.E,2d 804, 809 (1949).
240 Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1972) (bonus
promised for producing trade secret); Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969), Coleman v. Graybar Elec. Co., 195 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1952).
"' See Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Hepp v.
Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718-19, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 410-11 (1978) (en-
forcing recall policy). But see Murphine v. Hospital Auth. of Floyd County, 151 Ga. App. 722,
723, 261 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1979) (court does not enforce policy of promotion based upon seniori-
ty).
242 Toussaint v. Blue Cross &Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 614-15, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 927 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980).
• 24 ' 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
2" Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
217 Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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is tantamount to concluding that an express contract for continued employ-
ment is condemned to remain terminable at will.'" The court concluded that
there was no strong public policy or other reason to prohibit the formation of a
good cause discharge employment contract. 249 Therefore, the court decided
that the employer should be bound by such promises. 25 °
Several other decisions also have concluded that it is both unfair and il-
logical for the courts to fail to enforce express representations which limit the
employer's power to discharge his employees."' These courts have determined
that the employment-at-will rule is one of construction, not substance, and that
the failure to enforce the promise of a good cause for discharge would render
that promise illusory."' In an attempt to enforce the intentions and expecta-
tions of the parties, these courts give preference to the substance of the express
promise of continued employment, rather than to the form of the at-will
employment contract. 253
The widespread acceptance of the reasoning of these decisions would have
a dramatic effect on the employment-at-will rule and the employment relation-
ship in general. Most non-unionized private sector employees receive promises
of continued employment from their employers. According to the theory of
Toussaint and similar cases, these promises can give rise to an enforceable right
of good cause for discharge if relied upon by the employee. Thus, for the first
time, the more than eighty million non-unionized employees in this country
may be accorded the protection of job security which the unionized sector of the
workforce traditionally has enjoyed.
Indeed, in its practical application, providing for the enforcement of such
promises could afford non-unionized employees greater job security than
unionized employees. Under most collective bargaining agreements, disputes
over whether good cause existed for a discharge are determined by an ar-
bitrator. 254 The arbitrator normally will have the experience and expertise
necessary to unravel the issues presented by such disputes. 255 A civil suit by a
2 ' 4 See id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.




v. Sec's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927
(1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980); Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-05, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
174-75 (1972).
252
	 e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
2" See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925
(1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980).
2" The collective bargaining agreement supercedes an individual employment contract.
Therefore, a unionized employee may not assert rights in court under a theory of an individual
contract of employment. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1944). Moreover, the
unionized employee protected by a grievance procedure is required to exhaust the grievance pro-
cedure before initiating litigation for breach of contract. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
"s The national labor policy which favors arbitration as the preferred method of resolv-
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private employee for breach of contract, however, carries with it the right to a
jury trial. 256
 In Toussaint, the court recognized that the legitimacy of the
employee's expectations regarding promises of continued employment were for
the jury to determine. 2" Because the jury probably will lack an arbitrator's ex-
pertise in this field, 258
 and because it probably will be more sympathetic to the
claims of the employee than an arbitrator, juries may render verdicts which ac-
cord non-unionized employees greater protection than unionized employees
have achieved . 259
In Toussaint, the court held that the issue of what promises could lead to an
employee's "legitimate expectation of job security," was one for the jury to
determine. 280
 The subjective opinion or interpretation of the employee might
suffice to create an enforceable job right. 28 ' At the extreme, the holding of the
court in Toussaint could result in an enforceable contract requiring good cause
for discharge in each instance in which a probationary period is established.
The employee could argue that he expected some form of job security upon the
expiration of the probationary period.'" However, whether it is the employee's
reliance and expectation or the actual existence of a promise that is necessary to
establish a contract is currently an unresolved issue.
Under the Toussaint approach, the benefits promised by the employer's
policies are considered inducements to employment. 288
 The promises are part
of the employment offer which the employee accepts. This approach is an ex-
tension of the analysis applied in Cain a. Allen Electric & Equipment Co. , 264 where
the court enforced a termination pay provision of the at-will employment con-
tract. The court found that the consideration provided by the employee to en-
force the promise was efficient work and spirited cooperation with others
ing labor disputes relies upon the policy that arbitrators are trained and experienced neutral
decision-makers. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960).
256 See text and notes at notes 301-12 infra.
"7
 See text and notes at notes 271-300 infra.
266 Arbitrators perform the function that otherwise would be performed by the courts. In
fact, the courts have been cautioned not to second-guess or replace their judgment for that of the
arbitrators precisely because they lack the expertise required to make such decisions. This policy
has been consistently applied following its adoption by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers
Trilogy. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960);
Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 M ICH.
L. REV. 751, 785-807 (1965).
259 In addition, because of their lack of experience with labor-management relations,
jurors may not define just cause as would an arbitrator or as an employer.
76°
 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 614, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980).
261 See id. at 6171 19, 292 N.W.2d at 893-94.
262 See, e.g., Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980).
263 In Toussaint the court reasoned that the promise could result in increased employee
morale and peace of mind. 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
264 346 Mich. 568, 577-78, 78 N.W.2d 296, 300-01 (1956).
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among the work force. 265 The employer benefits from an increase in employee
morale and productivity. Thus, courts following this approach recognize the
employee's legitimate reliance on these promises, and enforce those expecta-
tions by concluding that the employee has given sufficient consideration to
make the promises of the employer binding. 266
There are several defects in the reasoning of the cases following this ap-
proach, however. The first such flaw is that a promise of continued employ-
ment is not an inducement to employment unless it is in fact relied upon by the
employee."' Absent reliance by the employee, the employer receives no
equivalent consideration for his promise of good cause for discharge because
employees do not work more efficiently if they do not rely upon such promises.
The promise does not induce greater productivity because the employee
already receives compensation for the work which he performs. The compensa-
tion, rather than the promise for continued employment in the absence of good
cause, is the employer's consideration for the work performed."'
Moreover, the rationale of these decisions is not supportable insofar as it is
predicated upon the mutual intentions of the parties. An employer may
reasonably expect that his promise of good cause for discharge is unenforceable
because the courts traditionally have refused to enforce such promises under
the employment-at-will doctrine to defeat such claims. Thus, an employer's in-
tent when making such promises may be significantly different from the intent
of the employee when he receives the promise. Toussaint and similar cases fail to
consider the true intentions of the employer when entering an employment
contract. The contractual intent may be completely unilateral.
In light of reliance by employers on the employment-at-will rule, promises
of continued employment should be enforced prospectively, if at all. A prospec-
tive decision in the employer's jurisdiction would forewarn the employer that
his promises will be enforced and thereby allow him to enter employment con-
tracts which reflect the true intent of both parties. If an employer continues to
make assurances of continued employment, then there would be no good
reason to prevent the enforcement of such promises.'" Retrospective enforce-
ment of promises of continued employment would impose enormous financial
26 ' Id. at 575, 78 N.W.2d at 299.
266 Id. at 579, 78 N.W.2d at 301.
267 See Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96-97, 127 Cal. Rptr.
222, 225 (1976).
266 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 2, at 352.
269 For example, the court could render a declaratory judgment informing employers
that their promises will be enforced. The employer would then have the option of informing his
employees that it will honor its original promises if those promises have resulted or will result in
some tangible benefit to him. In the alternative, the employer could retract its original promises,
and require his employees to sign a new employment agreement acknowledging the employer's
right to discharge the employee at will. This new contract would supersede all prior oral and writ-
ten representations of job security. Under this new contract, the employee would have no
legitimate expectation of job security and a good cause discharge unless he provided additional
consideration at the time his employer made representations of continued employment.
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burdens on the employers and in most cases would not accurately reflect the in-
tentions of the employer in making assurances of continued employment.
In summary, Toussaint and similar cases dramatically undercut the tradi-
tional employment-at-will rule. If the approach followed in these cases gains
widespread acceptance, the relationship between employers and employees will
be altered significantly. Unless employers were willing to endanger the morale
of their workforce by refusing to assure their employees of continued employ-
ment, most at-will employees could claim that they could not be discharged
without good cause. The prospective application of this approach might
mitigate some of its impact upon an employer's personnel practices, but would
not prevent the disruption in the employment relationship which would result
from submitting these contract claims to a jury."°
D. Issues to be Determined by the Jury in a "Good Cause" Claim
In Toussaint, the court held that the issue of whether an employee was
discharged for good cause should properly be determined by the jury. 27 The
opinion did not make clear, however, whether it was for the court or for the
jury to determine what constitutes good cause for discharge. In addition,
Toussaint left open the question of who carries the burden of proof in breach of
contract actions. These unresolved issues are of great consequence to the
employment relationship. A jury should not be entitled to second guess an
employer's policy or practices to determine that they are insufficient justifica-
tions for a discharge. Such an approach would leave virtually all personnel
practices open to communal comment. A personnel practice that is justifiable
to one jury may be found pernicious to another. The likely result would then be
to subject employers to the threat of suit in every instance of a discharge as the
employee attempts to find a jury sympathetic to his cause. Thus, the only issue
that should be posed to the jury is whether the personnel practice was applied
equally to all employees. It is submitted that if an employer's promise of con-
tinued employment is to be given contractual force courts must limit the discre-
tion of the jury in determining what constitutes good cause.
To understand better the problems which may result from submitting to
the jury the issue of whether there was good cause for discharge, it is necessary
to distinguish between two issues which a jury might be called upon to resolve.
When an employer claims that he discharged an employee for a certain reason,
270 Under prospective enforcement, an employer may ask employees to sign a waiver of
their contractual right to job protection or a new contract of employment explicitly adopting the
-employment-at-will rule as the discharge provision. However, this might reduce employee
morale and, as a practical matter, may be considererd a bad personnel practice. Furthermore, it
is uncertain whether such subsequent waivers would be enforceable. The employee could claim
that he entered into the agreement under the duress of the threat of discharge. Alternatively,
employees could claim that a waiver is part of a contract of adhesion because they had no choice
but to agree to the provision or lose their job.
271 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 620-23, 292
N.W.2d 880, 896-97 (1980).
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the employee may respond in two ways. He may claim that he was discharged
for a reason other than that stated by the employer, and argue the second
reason did not constitute good cause."' Alternatively, the employee may admit
that he was discharged for the stated reason, but argue that the reason itself
was not good cause for the discharge. Thus, there are two distinct issues which
a jury might face: (I) was reason X the true reason for discharge, and, (2) does
reason X amount to good cause. 2 " The first issue may present complicated fac-
tual disputes; yet it remains a pure question of fact which is within the com-
petence of the jury to resolve. The second question presents a question of law as
to whether the law of employment relations should recognize reason X as good
cause for discharge. 274 It is submitted that if the proper burden of proof model
is applied to claims raising the first issue, 275 then that issue can be left to a jury.
The second issue, however, is beyond the competence of a jury. 276 Therefore,
this issue should be decided by the court, as a matter of law. It is not ap-
propriate for the jury to determine the second issue of what constitutes good
cause for discharge. If this determination were entrusted to the jury, then an
employer's sound judgment of how best to conduct his business always would
be subject to review by a panel of the employee's peers. The potential for a jury
to second guess the employer's judgment contains ominous overtones for per-
sonnel managers and labor relations officials.
Analogous issues have frequently confronted courts in cases involving
employment discrimination statutes. 277 Thus, in a claim alleging disparate im-
pact, the employer's policy is reviewed to determine whether the mere ex-
istence of the policy affects a greater percentage of the protected class. The
legitimacy of the policy, however, is not subject to question unless the disparate
272
	
assertion is similar to the claim in employment discrimination cases that an
employer's practice was a mere subterfuge for impermissible discrimination. See text and notes at
notes 277-91 infra.
2" This dichotomy was recognized by the Tou.ssaint court. See 408 Mich. at 622, 292
N.W.2d at 896.
274 If the employer articulates an unrebutted legitimate reason for discharge the court
must direct a verdict in its favor. Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254-56 (1981). What constitutes a legitimate practice is necessarily a determination for the court.
Several courts have held that in an employee's action for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement under 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 185 (1976), the
issue of whether just cause for discharge exists is one of law. Scott v. Riley Co., 645 F.2d 565, 567
(7th Cir. 1981); S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241,
1244 (7th Cir. 1978).
275 See text and notes at notes 277-91 infra.
276 But see Local 205, United Eke. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 172 F.
Supp. 53, 56 (D. Mass. 1959). The court defined the standard of good cause as " ...what a
reasonable person would find sufficient; the phrase creates an objective rather than a personal,
subjective test." Id. Under this legal standard a jury might be instructed to resolve the legal issue
under a reasonable man theory, as in tort cases.
277 These statutes include: 42 U.S.C. 55 2000e-2000e-17 (1976); The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 5§ 621-34 (1976); The Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, 38 U.S.C. 55 2011-14 (1976); The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. 55 701.94 (1976).
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impact is first established. In a breach of contract claim there are no statistics to
help determine whether the employer's policy is a good cause to discharge an
employee. Therefore, this determination can only be made on the basis of the
subjective opinion of each particular juror.
What is a good cause for an employer may not necessarily be a good cause
in the subjective opinion of the jury. If the sole issue to be resolved is the
employer's true motive for the personnel action, the claim will resemble one for
discrimination. This model was used in Rabazo-Alvarez v. Dart Industries, Inc. , 278
where the factfinder found that the employer was not in "good faith dissatisfied
with plaintiff's performance. "279 The trial court determined that the discharge
was predicated upon a bad faith motive.'" Permitting a jury to question the
legitimacy of an employment policy would significantly expand upon tradi-
tional legal analysis and have broad ramifications for all employment practices.
It would thoroughly interfere with managerial discretion."' Taken to its ex-
treme, a jury could determine that layoff for economic reasons is not good
cause and should be remediable."'
An appropriate burden of proof model for the breach of contract action
would be one similar to that used in claims of disparate treatment arising under
employment discrimination statutes.'" In these cases, the courts are concerned
with the true motive for the employer's actions in an individual personnel deci-
sion but they do not permit a determination of whether the employer's policies
should be undermined.'"
The traditional analysis employed by the courts in a claim of discrimina-
tion predicated upon disparate treatment was established by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green. 285 Under this analysis, an employee
2 " 50 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
279 Id. at 97, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
"° See id.
28 ' The potential danger inherent in this analysis was recognized in Pugh v. See's Can-
dies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), where the court stated: "Essentially,
[good cause and just cause] connote 'a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on
the part of the party exercising the power.' Care must be taken, however, not to interfere with
the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion." Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928.
287
 Where an economic layoff has been the subject of litigation, the issue for the jury is
whether the employer's action is applied in a discriminatory fashion, The employer is permitted
to rebut an inference of discrimination by providing economic data to support the decision to
place employees on layoff. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461, 465-66 (1st
Cir. 1976); J.A. Hackney & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 943, 944-45 (4th Cir. 1970). See also
Goodwin v. Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of the City of Kalamazoo, 82 Mich. App. 559,
572-73, 267 N.W.2d 142, 149 (1978); Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n v. Cafana
cleaners, Inc., 73 Mich. App. 752, 757-58, 252 N.W.2d 536, 538 (1977).
It is unlikely thata reasonable juror could reach this decision. In fact, if this is the basis
for a breach of contract action, the court should dismiss the claim as a matter of law because the
NLRB and arbitrators have determined that an economic layoff is a justifiable employment prac-
tice.
2" See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
28♦ See, e.g., Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56
(1981).
285 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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must initially establish a prima facie showing of a discriminatory purpose for
the discharge. 286 If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
production is transferred to the employer who must rebut the presumption of
discriminatory purpose."' In order to meet his burden of production, the
employer must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the per-
sonnel action. 288 The plaintiff then is required to establish that the employer's
articulated justifications were a mere pretext for discrimination. 289 Unless a
plaintiff ultimately can establish the employer's discriminatory motive in a
claim of discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment, the employer's
action will be vindicated. 290 Thus, in a claim predicated upon a civil rights
statute, the burden of proving that a decision to discharge an employee was
made in bad faith or for a bad cause always remains with the plaintiff. In a
claim for breach of contract, however, it is unclear whether the employer must
286 Id. at 802. The elements of the prima facie case vary depending upon the personnel
action in question. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the standards
established in McDonnell-Douglas, the employee in most instances must prove that: (1) he was a
member of the protected class; (2) he was performing the job; (3) he was discharged; and (4) the
job continued to be performed by another employee or that similarly situated employees from
outside the class were not discharged. See id. at 802 n.13. See also Whiting v. Jackson State Univ.,
616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980); Hicks v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 503 F. Supp. 930, 934, 24
FEP Cas. 1207, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Daniel v. Marcal Paper Mills, 24 FEP Cas. 823 (D.N.J.
1980); Pettus v. Dow Badische Chemical Co., 23 FEP Cas. 615, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
287 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
288 Id.
"9 See id. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78 (1978); Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978).
This proof model was adopted by a California state court in a breach of contract claim.
See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). Under the
Pugh approach, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim by proving the existence of an express
or implied promise of discharge for cause or reliance sufficient to state an estoppel claim. See id. at
329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a
reason for the employee's termination. See id. The employee may then attack the employer's ex-
planation on the ground that it is a mere pretext or is insufficient to meet the employer's obliga-
tions under the contract. Id. at 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The employee, however, "bears
the ultimate burden of proving that he was terminated wrongfully." Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at
927.
280 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977),
where the Court stated:
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
*	 «
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity ....Proof of
discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact
theory.
Id. at 336 n.15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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merely articulate a legitimate reason for his actions or whether he must prove
that good cause existed to terminate the employee. 291
Imposing on the employer the burden of proving good cause would com-
port with the proof model applied in cases involving breach of an employment
contract for a definite duration. 292 In such cases, employees have the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case by demonstratng the existence of a
contract and a discharge prior to the expressed expiration date. 2" The
employer must then prove that good cause existed for the discharge. 294
 A more
rational method for dividing the burden of proof in these cases, however,
would be the three-tiered analysis currently used in claims predicated on a civil
291
 The court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. stated:
Where an employee is discharged for stated reasons which he contends are
not "good cause'' for discharge, the role of the jury is more difficult to resolve. If
the jury is permitted to decide whether there was good cause for discharge, there is
the danger that it will substitute its judgment for the employer's. If the jurors
would not have fired the employee for doing what he admittedly did, or for what
they find he did, the employer may be held liable in damages although the
employee was discharged in good faith and the employer's decision was not
unreasonable.
While the promise to terminate employment only for cause includes the right
to have the employer's decision reviewed, it does not include a right to be
discharged only with the concurrence of the communal judgment of the jury.
Nevertheless, we have considered and rejected the alternative of instructing the
jury that it may not find a breach if it finds the employer's decision to discharge the
employee was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Such an instruction would transform a good cause contract into a satisfaction
contract. The employer may discharge under a satisfaction contract as long as he is
in good faith dissatisfied with the employee's performance or behavior. The in-
struction under consideration would permit the employer to discharge as long as
his dissatisfaction (cause) is not unreasonable. The difference is minute.
Where the employee has secured a promise not to be discharged except for
cause, he has contracted for more than the employer's promise to act in good faith
or not to be unreasonable. An instruction which permits the jury to review only for
reasonableness inadequately enforces that promise.
In addition to deciding questions of fact and determining the employer's true
motive for discharge, the jury should, where such a promise was made, decide
whether the reason for discharge amounts to good cause. Is it the kind of thing that
justifies terminating the employment relationship? Does it demonstrate that the
employee was no longer doing the job?
4.	 ♦ 	 *
[Employers that enter into implied contracts of employment], we agree must be
permitted to establish their own standards for job performance and to dismiss for
non-adherence to those standards although another employer or the jury might
have established lower standards.
408 Mich. 579, 622-23, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896-97 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
292
 W.P. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE 5 1 10 (8th ed. 1955).
292 See Williams v. Action for a Better Community, Inc., 51 A.D.2d 876, 877, 380
N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (1976).
294
 Felsen v. Sol Mfg. Corp., 24 N.Y.2d 682, 685, 301 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (1969);
Williams v. Action for a Better Community, Inc., 51 A.D.2d 876, 877, 380 N. Y.S.2d 138, 140
(1976); Wegman v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 50 A.D.2d 108, 111, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728, 733 (1975);
W.P. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE 5 110 (8th ed. 1955).
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rights statute. 295 Under this proof model, the burden of establishing that bad
cause or that no cause existed for the discharge would always remain with the
employee. Adopting this model of proof would provide for symmetry among
employee remedies; if the employee fails to establish an impermissible motive
for the termination, he should lose his claim regardless of whether it is brought
under a theory of discrimination, breach of the employment contract, or the
tort of wrongful discharge.
Allocating the burden of proof in breach of contract claims in this fashion,
and reserving the question of good cause as one of law, would be appropriate to
a jury's capability and an employer's needs and would not alter significantly an
employee's legitimate expectations. Once a personnel policy has been adopted,
and it is determined by the employer to be a reasonable ground for discharge,
the employee can expect this policy to be part of the good cause employment
contract. Therefore, the factfinder would not be permitted to question the per-
sonnel practice or policy. Under this approach, for example, a judge should in-
struct the jury in the following manner:
The plaintiff in this case claims that he was discharged for X
reason. The defendant claims to have discharged the plaintiff for Y
reason. You are to determine whether the plaintiff was discharged
for X reason or for Y reason. If you determine that the plaintiff was
discharged for Y reason, then I instruct you to find for the defend-
ant. If you determine that the reason was X reason, then I instruct
you to find for the plaintiff.
As in traditional employment discrimination claims, the issue submitted to the
factfinder in a breach of contract action should be limited to whether the policy
is motivated by bad faith or applied to individuals in an unequal fashion.'"
The difficulty in determining whether the employer discharged an
employee for good cause is exacerbated in the case of upper-level managerial
employees. The standards for determining whether to retain these employees
are substantially different from those used in evaluating the performance of
entry-level employees. Because production may be measured or quantified for
many entry-level employees, their performance may be determined by objec-
tive standards. An objective standard providing for a comparison among
employees may serve to legitimize a decision to discharge the employee.
The managerial employee, in contrast, frequently is evaluated by substan-
tially different criteria, many of which are subjective. For example, lack of con-
fidence among superiors, co-workers, and subordinates often is an important
factor in determining whether to discharge a manager.'" This determination is
"' See text and notes at notes 285-91 supra.
296 Pughs v. See's Candies Store, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
927 (1981).
297 In Pughs v. See's Candies Store, Inc., the court stated: "[W]here as here, the
employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity
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completely subjective, not readily definable by quantitative measures. It may
not be possible to compare the work product of two managers. Furthermore, a
change in operations may require managerial employees who possess special
skills or abilities. Similarly, other factors relied on in evaluating managerial
employees, such as the ability to plan and organize or the ability to work well
with others in a leadership capacity, are subjective in nature. If the question of
whether there was just cause for the discharge of a managerial employee were
submitted to a jury, the jury would have no objective criteria with which to
evaluate the employer's decision.
Protecting the employee's good faith expectations of job security may be a
fair societal objective. This goal, however, must be balanced against the
employer's ability to operate his business under a theory of managerial discre-
tion whereby the employer and not the jury determine what is a legitimate per-
sonnel practice. Allowing the jury to determine what constitutes good cause for
discharge would place employers in a quandary when making personnel deci-
sions. If a jury can eliminate an employer's practice, no policy or procedure
will be immune from the communal re-evaluation."' Given the choice between
the potential contractual liability from discharging an employee for what the
employer, in good faith believes to be good cause, and accepting open defiance
to an employment policy, the employer may simply amend the policy or
tolerate the defiance. 299
 To avoid these potential problems, the determination
of whether certain personnel policies provide a good cause for discharge should
be made by the court as a matter of law. Several courts have determined that
where an employee openly defies a policy or is insubordinate any contract pro-
tection which he might have had will be forfeited."° Thus, the courts should
be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment." Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 928. See also Note, Al Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1840.
2" See,	 , Lake Shore & W.R. Co. v. Tierney, 8-Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 521, aff'd, 75 Ohio
St. 565, 80 N.E. 1128 (1905), where the court held that the good faith beliefs of the employer did
not in all circumstances constitute good cause beyond the purview of a judicial determination. 8
Ohio C.C. (n.s.) at 523.
299
 For example, in Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980),
the plaintiff sued for wrongful discharge. Id. at 373, 290 N.W.2d at 536. The employer had
discharged the employee when the employee, in violation of company policy, attempted to bid for
the same shift as that occupied by his female roommate. Id. at 376, 29 N.W.2d at 538. The court
found that the policy was fair and that there was no evidence of malice in the treatment accorded
the plaintiff. Id. at 377, 290 N.W.2d at 538. Therefore, the court refused to permit an action in
tort, finding that the employer's policy did not violate the state's public policy in favor of peaceful
labor relations. See id.
30° See, e.g., Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976)
(employee discharged for insubordination); Vincent Allen & Assocs., Inc. v. Weis, 63 III. App.
3d 285 (1978) (court looks to those policies delineated by the employer to determine what con-
stitutes good cause); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, 63 A.D.2d 858, 859, 406 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (1978)
(employee discharged for fighting); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775
(1975) (employee discharged for absenteeism); Maxwell v. Cardinal Petroleum Corp., 460
S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 471 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1971). In Max-
well, the court stated: "What constitutes a good and sufficient cause for the discharge of the
employee is a question of law, and, where the facts are undisputed, it is for the court to say
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consider the implications of the issues to be resolved by the jury and permit an
employer to continue to implement the personnel practices of his choice
without the spectre of liability for breach of the employment contract.
These issues take on greater significance when it is considered that a
breach of contract action often may be brought by an employee who also
alleges that his discharge was discriminatory. The combination of these distinct
causes of action poses several difficult issues for the courts. The burden of proof
model which has been carefully developed in cases involving discrimination
may be undermined if courts fail to apply the same standard of proof to claims
asserting breach of the employment contract.
V. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND TITLE VII CLAIMS
A. Judge or Jury
The emergence of new exceptions to the traditional employment-at-will
rule under both tort and contract law becomes more important given the
possibility that discharged employees may attempt to join these claims to
claims brought under employment discrimination statutes. Such joinder would
raise problems concerning the respective roles of the judge and the jury, the ap-
plication of inconsistent statutes of limitation, and the type of damages which
might be awarded in such cases.
For example, in an effort to obtain the right to a jury trial, an employee
might join a claim based on one of the emerging exceptions to the employment-
at-will rule to a claim arising under an employment discrimination statute.
Claims brought pursuant to these statutes may or may not carry this right. An
action brought under Title VII is equitable"' in nature and therefore will not
entitle the employee to a jury trial. There is no uniform authority on the issue
whether a claim brought under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is to
be determined by a judge or a jury. 302 Therefore, in some cases brought under
this statute, the judge will be the finder of fact. Under the emerging exceptions
to the employment-at-will rule, however, a claim for compensatory damages
whether the discharge was justified." Id. at 440. See also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003
(1st Cir. 1978), where the court dismissed a claim of age discrimination where there existed
legitimate independent grounds for dismissal of the employee. Id. at 1019.
3°' The courts have uniformly held that Title VII authorizes only equitable relief, such
as back pay. There is no constitutional guarantee of a jury trial for equitable claims and therefore
neither party has a right to a jury trial. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366, 375 n.19 (1979); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979); Grayson v. The
Wicks Corp., 607 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585
F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Harmon v. May Broadcasting
Co., 583 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 926 (3d Cir. 1977); Pear-
son v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th Cir. 1976); Russell v. American Tobacco
Co., 528 F.2d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
342 Compare EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) with Setser v. Novak Indus., 638 F.2d 1137, 24 FEP
Cas. 1793 (8th Cir. 1981); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Moore
v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 154, 24 FEP Cas. 1072 (6th Cir. 1980).
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may be construed as a claim for legal damages."' A claim for legal relief always
accords the plaintiff a right to a jury trial. 304 Thus, under the doctrine of pend-
ent jurisdiction, 305 a discharged employee may attempt to join a claim for
breach of contract or wrongful discharge with a Title VII action and thereby
demand that a jury hear all his claims at once. If successful, such joinder would
alter substantially the trial procedure and increase the cost to the employer of
defending his personnel decision. Such joinder also would defeat the intent of
Congress that Title VII claims should be heard by the judge and not the jury.
Furthermore, Congress enacted a comprehensive plan for enforcing Title VII
rights which employs both state agencies and the EEOC in investigatory and
conciliatory roles. 306 This process might be frustrated if an employee believes
he has the right to a jury trial and two alternative theories of recovery.
In the alternative, a court could deny joinder of the common law claim
with the Title VII claim in order to avoid this conflict over the right to a jury
trial. Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, the joinder of state claims to
federal claims is discretionary."' For example, where state claims accord
remedies not available under the federal statute, or involve procedures and
substantive questions which are yet to be resolved by the state courts, pendent
jurisdiction may be denied. 308 Although the two claims contain a common
3D3 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980), where the court submitted claims for compensatory damages arising under the employ-
ment contract to the jury. .
304 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974).
"5 See, e.g., Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 22 FEP Cas. 1139 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Pen-
dent jurisdiction of the federal courts is invoked when the same common nucleus of facts gives
rise to both a federal and a state cause of action. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966). Under the doctrine, a federal court has discretion to resolve both claims in a single
proceeding. Id. at 726.
3 ° 8 Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). The
Supreme Court has held:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for
achieving this goal. To this end, Congress ... established a procedure whereby
existing state and local employment agencies, as well as the Commission, would
have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation and per-
suasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.
Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
307 United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-26.
308 Id. at 726-27; Mazzare v. Burroughs Corp., 473 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Douglas v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298, 304-06 (D. Conn. 1979); Kennedy v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo, 1978); Hannon v. Continental
Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977); Silverman v. Lehigh Univ., 19 FEP Cas.
983, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See Jong-Yul Lim v. The Intl Inst. of Metropolitan Detroit, Inc., 510
F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1981), where the court discussed the issue of whether to join a breach
of contract action to a claim for violation of Title VII. In denying joinder, the court held that the
damages recoverable, the administrative procedure involved (specifically the statutory time
limits), and the congressional policy requiring trial by judge or master, made joinder of the
claims impractical. But see Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978) (court
permitted a claim for breach of contract to be joined to a claim for age discrimination); Freeman
v. Kelvinator, Inc., 22 FEP Cas. 1139 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc.,
75 F.R.D. 499, 505-06 (D. Del. 1977).
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nucleus of facts, they derive from fundamentally different rights, a factor which
provides the court with a justification to deny joinder. 309 In addition, the court
may determine that when the relief which can be awarded in both actions is
equal, 3 t° procedural differences outweigh other considerations of judicial
economy and equity. 3 " Therefore, it seems well within the discretion of a
federal court to deny joinder in these circumstances. The consequence of a
denial of joinder is that an employer may be forced to defend similar claims in
different forums based upon a single discharge which is alleged to be both
discriminatory and without good cause. Unless the principle of collateral estop-
pel is applied, 312 the possibility exists that in a federal action, a judge may
determine that an employer's motive was legitimate, while in the state action a
jury may find that a personnel practice was not good cause for discharge. The
possibility of inconsistent outcomes at different trials, and the cost incurred in
conducting separate trials on similar issues clearly is undesirable.
The issues identified above cannot be resolved simply. A possible solution
would be to require the joinder of the claims in one trial. This alternative,
however, would appear to violate the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII
by granting a jury trial to all litigants who allege a breach of their employment
contract in addition to their claim under the statute. A more radical approach
would be to establish a system of labor courts with the expertise of labor-
management neutrals. Although this alternative would deprive the litigant of
his right to a jury trial on his contract and tort claims, it would guarantee a
hearing before an experienced neutral party trained to resolve such disputes.
B. Statute of Limitations Issues
Joinder of statutory claims with those based upon the emerging exceptions to
the employment-at-will rule also may present problems arising from the ap-
plication of inconsistent statutes of limitations. A claim for a violation of Title
VII must be brought within 240 days of the discharge. 313 A court lacks jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim unless the plaintiff abides by the statute of limitations. 314
A claim of discrimination arising under section 1981 must be brought within
the time limit established by the state statute of limitations for tort actions. 315




312 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS $ 68(1) (1942). Section 68(1) states: "Where a
question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a dif-
ferent cause of action...."
31 ' See Mohasco Corp. v. Silvers, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5(c) 	 (c)
(1976).
3 " Failure to bring timely charges with the appropriate agency is fatal to the Title VII
action. Mohasco Corp. v. Silvers, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
3 " Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
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This period varies, but is usually one to three years. 316
 A claim for breach of the
employment contract should be limited by the state statute governing breach of
contract actions. Although these statutes vary among the jurisdictions, they
generally afford the plaintiff more time to bring his claim than the statute of
limitations governing discrimination suits. 3 ' 7 Thus, a claimant who alleges
discrimination as the basis for a breach of contract action may have significant-
ly more time to bring his lawsuit than a claimant alleging discrimination under
a civil rights statute.
C. Damages
The joinder of statutory, tort and contract claims for wrongful discharge
also raises a problem relating to the type of damages that may be recovered.
Back pay is the traditional equitable remedy awarded to a plaintiff in a Title
VII action. 3 " The measure of damages should be the same where the claim is
predicated on breach of contract.
Historically, damages arising from the breach of a commercial contract
have been limited to those which were foreseeable to the parties at the time they
entered into the contract. 319
 An employment contract is commercial in nature
and should not be treated in a different fashion from any other commercial con-
tract. 32° Therefore, damages in a breach of contract claim which arises from a
discharge should be limited to back pay reduced by any interim earnings
received by the discharged employee. 3 " Loss of compensation is the only
adverse consequence that is reasonably foreseeable to the parties at the time
they enter into the contract. Thus, the amount of damages recoverable in a
316
 MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 600.5805(7) (1970) (three-year Michigan statute of limita-
tions for injuries to person or property).
"? See, e.g. , N.Y Cry. PRAC. 5 213(2) (McKinney- 1972) (six-year statute of limitations
for breach of contract actions). The length of time during which an employee can sue for breach
of contract of continued employment usually will be greater than the time alloted under the
discrimination statutes regardless of whether the courts characterize the contents of the personnel
policy handbook as creating an express or implied contract. This distinction is significant in those
jurisdictions which have different statutes of limitations for the two different forms of contracts.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 600.5805(8) (1970) (three-year statute of limitations applicable to
actions based upon implied contracts). Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 401 Mich. 118, 126-29,
257 N.W.2d 640, 644-45 (1977). The six-year statute of limitations, however, is applied to claims
based upon express contract. MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 600.5807(8) (1970), The issue of whether a
policy handbook creates an express or an implied contract has not been answered definitively by
the recent decisions. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 598-99,
292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980). See also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc,, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981)
where the court recognized that the employment contract may be express or implied.
318
 EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975).
3 " Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 417, 295 N.W.2d 50,
66 (1980) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
32° Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst. of Detroit, Inc., 51 Mich. App. 220, 227, 214 N.W.2d
864, 865 (1974).
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breach of contract action should be equivalent to the amount of damages
recoverable for a violation of Title VII.
A plaintiff who asserts a claim for the tort of wrongful discharge, however,
may be entitled to significantly greater damages than those which are
recoverable in a Title VII action. An employee suing in tort may seek to
recover punitive damages, or damages for mental anguish if the action com-
plained of is an intentional tort. 322 This difference in the amount of damages
recoverable may encourage the addition of a tort cause of action for wrongful
discharge in all Title VII claims. A possible solution to this problem is for the
court to refuse to recognize tort claims based upon violations of a discrimina-
tion statute. 323
CONCLUSION
The recent modifications in the employment-at-will rule are of great im-
portance to both non-unionized employees and their employers alike. The
recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge has provided employees necessary
protection against the discharges for bad cause which violate public policy. The
development of a good cause for discharge requirement under contract law,
however, would fundamentally alter the principles embodied within the
employment-at-will rule. Union employees fought ardently for the right to
good cause for their discharge, frequently sacrificing economic rewards to at-
tain this protection. Now the courts may be on the verge of extending this right
to all employees. Recognizing this right would accord private sector employees
an important measure of job security and would eliminate the harsh conse-
quences of bad faith employment practices. Despite the desirability of these
developments, courts nevertheless should avoid overzealousness and haste in
their correction of perceived inequities. Employers have relied upon the
employment-at-will rule for a century and have formulated policies based upon
this rule. The harsh consequences to employees of discharges made in bad faith
could be equalled by the enormous burden which may befall an employer who
is forced to justify to a jury each and every employee discharge. The financial
burden of this potential consequence is ominous.
In light of the developing exceptions to the employment-at-will rule,
employers would be well advised to create procedures which assure that
discharges are based upon objective factors and made in good faith. To insure
fairness and objectivity in decisions to terminate employees, an internal
grievance procedure could be adopted by the employer. Such a grievance pro-
cedure would provide aggrieved employees an opportunity to be heard. It
would also provide an opportunity for the employer to reinstate employees who
were discharged in bad faith. Such a grievance procedure might also produce
" See text and notes at note 137 supra.
"3 See Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 917-18 (E.D. Mich.
1977). See also text and notes at notes 138-48 supra.
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objective and persuasive evidence that the decision to discharge was made in
good faith and based upon objective criteria. Moreover, an employee's failure
to use this procedure might provide an employer with a procedural defense to
the breach of contract or tort action. In analogous circumstances, courts have
required union employees to exhaust internal grievance procedures prior to
bringing a civil action. 324
The changing nature of the employment relationship will undoubtedly
continue to develop. Critics of, as well as adherents to, the employment-at-will
doctrine must be prepared to scrutinize closely the decisions of courts.
324
 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
